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Style vs. Model: Why Quibble?
Susan Oberman*
INTRODUCTION
Use of labels to connote differences in the range of mediator practices
frames the ongoing discourse about "how to" mediate. Mediation scholars
and practitioners refer to differences as: approach, orientation, style,
* Susan Oberman is a certified family mediator in Charlottesville, Virginia in solo private practice as
Common Ground Negotiation Services. She began mediating in 1987 as a volunteer for the
Community Mediation Center in Suffolk County, New York. She brings over twenty years of
mediation experience and scholarship to her work with couples, families, and community groups.
She developed and practices the Sustainable Knowledge Model of Norm-Educating Mediation,
based on the Norm-Educating category of mediation models, defined by Ellen Waldman. The
Sustainable Knowledge Model is grounded in the theory that clients make better and more lasting
decisions when they have all relevant information. Recognizing that mediation operates "in the
shadow of the law," Ms. Oberman believes the mediator is responsible for insuring that clients are
informed about their rights throughout the mediation process, thereby protecting self-determination.
Her workshops on Defining Mediation Models: A Professional Conundrum, and The Norm-
Educating Mediation Model address the necessity for mediators to understand and articulate the
model each uses, and to be informed about the other existing models. Correspondence may be
addressed to her at cgns@susanoberman.com
My concerns about the use of the words "style," "orientation," and "approach," to describe
differences in mediator practices is the result of the work of Dorothy Della Noce, who in 2002 in her
keynote speech to the Virginia Mediation Network, challenged us to define what model we use.
Similar to most of my colleagues, I had never entertained the fact that I was using a model. After
doing extensive research I found that despite a considerable amount of scholarship on the issue, there
was still much confusion and little agreement; for the most part, the contradictions and complexities
are being ignored or dismissed in mediation training programs and Standards of Ethics. Even after
Leonard Riskin's keynote address in 2003 at the Virginia Mediation Network, in which he stated that
he never meant for his categories of "facilitative" and "evaluative" to be considered mutually
exclusive, the use of these terms by many mediators to explain what they do, persisted. This article is
an attempt to bring both scholars and practitioners into the conversation that the Transformative
Mediation scholars began, and that Leonard Riskin and Ellen Waldman have been working to
further, for well over a decade. In addition, the conversation on models is placed in the context of a
150-year history of mediation as it has been promoted and regulated by the courts.
Much appreciation goes to my readers, Ellen Waldman, Dorothy Della Noce, Stephanie
Wildman, Terry Rogers and Rachel Mann for their time, attention, suggestions, and encouragement.
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artistry, and model.' Many might well ask, why quibble? 2  Why bother
arguing amongst ourselves? Why cause conflict over a few simple words?
This article contends that language 3-what is said, how it is said, and what
meanings are assigned to the words-is critical in mediation itself,4 and is
certainly no less so in defining what mediators do.5 Language is the shared
experience of the community. 6 The words used and the meanings given to
them inform the actions taken.7 Thus, naming and defining the problem8 is
a key to addressing conflict. The names assigned to differences in mediation
theory, ideology, and practice, determine the meanings of these differences.
Before evaluating the terms used to acknowledge mediator differences,
it is necessary to recognize historical context. Use of non-legal processes9
1. Use of italics throughout the article is meant to alert the reader to the fact that the
definitions and practices associated with the italicized words are not to be assumed; there is little
analysis, and no agreement on what the meanings and practices are, or should be.
2. Jeffrey W. Stemple, Identifying Real Dichotomies Underlying the False Dichotomy,
Twenty-First Century Mediation in an Eclectic Regime, 2000 J. DIsP. RESOL., 371, 372. Stemple
characterizes differences with commentators as "points of distinct conflict or quibble ...." Id. A
Foucaultian analysis would point out that his use of the word quibble automatically reduces the
discourse to a kind of petty, childish problem. See also Joseph B. Stulberg, Facilitative Versus
Evaluative Mediation: A Discussion, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 985, 986 (1997).
3. JOHN M. CONLEY & WILLIAM M. O'BARR, JUST WORDS 39 (1998), stating that "[i]f
language can be understood as a meaning-making activity rather than a passive reporting function,
meaning cannot be chosen arbitrarily. Language is then seen as having the function of permitting or
constraining the options that might be available to us."
4. JOHN WINSLADE & GERALD MONK, NARRATIVE MEDIATION A NEW APPROACH TO
CONFLICT RESOLUTION 41 (2000), stating that "mediation is more than just a place where particular
interpersonal problems get resolved and some kind of social homeostasis gets restored. It is where
we should take care to talk with an eye on the kind of world we are creating because we are always
in the process of creating it."
5. WINSLADE & MONK, supra note 4, at 39, stating that "it does not make sense to say that
people have thoughts or feelings on the inside that precede their expression. It makes more sense to
speak about how discourse and linguistic formulations make up our subjective experience. In other
words, language, or discourse, is a precondition for thought."
6. DONALD E. POLKINGHORNE, NARRATIVE KNOWING AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES 23
(1988), stating that "[lI]anguage needs to be understood as more than simply a skill for encoding
nonlinguistic thoughts with messages that can be understood by others. Language is both the
product and the possession of a community."
7. See WINSLADE & MONK, supra note 4, at 40, stating that "[l]anguage is performative, and
its use is a form of social action."
8. MURRAY EDELMAN, POLITICAL LANGUAGE: WORDS THAT SUCCEED AND POLICIES THAT
FAIL 29 (1977), stating that "[w]hen we name and classify a problem, we unconsciously establish the
status and the roles of those involved with it, including their self-conceptions."
9. See JEROLD AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW? 19-20 (1983). Auerbach uses the term
"non-legal dispute resolution" to connote dispute resolution practices in communities, specifically
during the American Colonial period and later among immigrant communities, that do not reference
the law. "The tighter the communal bonds, the less need there was for lawyers or courts.. (T]hey
preferred to live within a communal framework that rendered formal legal institutions superfluous or
even dangerous. For them, law was a necessary evil or a last resort, not a preferred choice." Id.
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for dispute settlement preceded the law's rise as the reference point for
disputes in U.S. culture.' In contrast to dispute resolution practices within
communities, implementation of informal legal processes came from the
court. Promotion of informal legal processes occurred during periods when
the courts came under attack." Reformers called for increased efficiency,
greater access to justice, or both. 12  Mediation is one of several processes
offered through the courts that claim to provide informal justice through
participation and cooperation. 13  Mediation has functioned at several
junctures in U.S. legal history to deflect criticism from courts, at the same
time carrying out the court's agenda to control social conflict. 14  Lack of
awareness by both mediators and the public about this history and
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) processes (informalism) 5 as a
correction for court failures, 16 causes confusion about the relationship
10. Laura Nader, The Recurrent Dialectic Between Legality and Its Alternatives: The
Limitations of Binary Thinking, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 621, 623 (1984) (reviewing JEROLD S.
AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW? (1983)) noting how "[d]uring the colonial period, legal
institutions played a relatively minor role in dispute settlement because the colonists were hostile to
external interference that might contribute to community disorganization or that might challenge the
basic community value system."
11. See AUERBACH supra note 9, at 136, stating that "[a]lternative dispute settlement offered
mechanical remedies for political problems: the characteristic response of law reformers since the
turn of the century as they struggled to neutralize political opposition to the values that the legal
system protected."
12. CHRISTINE B. HARRINGTON, SHADOW JUSTICE: THE IDEOLOGY AND
INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF ALTERNATIVES TO COURT, 22 (1985), stating that "[r]eformers
maintained that by streamlining both institutions and procedures administrative efficiencies would
provide greater access to justice. "
13. See HARRINGTON, supra note 12, at 22, stating that "to legitimize judicial intervention in a
liberal democracy reformers also appealed to participatory ideals. Progressives believed that law
would be a more effective socializing agent if citizens participated more directly in informal
proceedings."
14. RICHARD HOFRICHTER, NEIGHBORHOOD JUSTICE IN CAPITALIST SOCIETY THE EXPANSION
OF THE INFORMAL STATE, xxiv-xxv (1987) stating that "[l]iberal legal reformism aspires to solve the
problem of social order through cooperation, administrative management of political conflict, and
impartial mediation between opposing classes. It views conflict as an evil to be avoided, absorbed,
or resolved-all within the prevailing order."
15. See HARRINGTON, supra note 12, at 2 stating that "[t]he ideology of informalism is
structured by its relationship to delegalization movements and order maintenance concerns...
Ostensibly replacing formalism as an ideology, informalism retains a legalistic core that ties it to
conventional practice."
16. Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Language and Legal Change in Child
Custody Decisionmaking, 101 HARV. L. REV. 727, 754-55 (1988), stating that "[t]hose who flock to
mediation as the ideal decisionmaking mechanism accuse lawyers and the adversary system of
increasing trauma, escalating conflict, obstructing communication, failing to perceive the need for
3
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between ADR and the law. 7  The parties' self-determination in deciding
which process is appropriate, and in knowing what interventions will be
used, cannot be fulfilled if mediators themselves are confused.
In the service of case management efficiency,18 courts define mediation
as a generic problem-solving process' 9 with minor deviations based on the
artistry of the individual mediator. This generic process promises the
neutrality of mediation based on equating neutrality with detachment.2 °
This article challenges the assumption that mediation is a generic process
and argues that the terms artistry and style, when used to describe mediator
differences, in effect, conceal mediator bias. In addition to the court's
agenda to promote a generic process, there is a contradiction between court
support of mediation as a desirable replacement for a judicial decision, 21 and
the endorsement of services delivered by volunteers (or those who will
accept minimal remuneration). The assurances made by the court of quality
mediation services delivered by volunteers, function as an obstacle to a more
comprehensive discourse on mediator differences.
For over a decade, scholars such as Robert A. Baruch Bush, Joseph P.
Folger,22 Leonard Riskin,23 and Ellen Waldman,24 have challenged the
negotiation and counseling, and generally interfering with the development of a process that could
help the parties."
17. Richard L. Abel, Introduction, in THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE VOLUME I: THE
AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 6 (Richard L. Abel, ed., 1982). stating that:
Where formal institutions are largely passive and reactive, informal institutions can be
purposive and proactive. They obliterate the fundamental liberal distinction between
public and private, state and civil society, what is forbidden and what is allowed. In
order to facilitate this expansion, they carefully cultivate the appearance of being
noncoercive.
18. Dorothy J. Della Noce, Mediation Theory and Policy: The Legacy of the Pound
Conference, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 545,546 (2002), stating that "[d]espite the clear
recognition of the unique social value of mediation in various dimensions of human interaction, th[e]
argument cast the potential value of the mediation process in terms of improved case management
efficiency."
19. See Fineman, supra note 16, at 728, regarding the focus in ADR on process changes, not
substantive changes: "[B]ecause these changes are presented in procedural terms, the rhetoric
concerning mediation has masked, at the same time that it has facilitated, the extensive shifts in
substantive results. Labeling changes as procedural makes them easier to accept but also obscures
the substantive changes that are taking place."
20. Christine B. Harrington & Sally Engle Merry, Ideological Production: The Making of
Community Mediation, 22 LAW & Soc'Y REv., 709, 729 (1988), stating that "[m]ediators interpret
neutrality as the maintenance of what we might call a 'detached stance,' empathy without acceptance
of the values of others."
21. See Fineman, supra note 16, at 759, addressing the court support of custody mediation:
"Mediators have been empowered by judges and court administrators who dislike custody
decisionmaking under the best interest test, or who believe that such cases clog up the system."
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dominant discourse promoted by the court about a generic mediation
process. The evaluative and facilitative labels, 25 named by Riskin and
widely adopted as the way to differentiate mediation styles, prevent other
significant issues from being raised. 26  This article raises some of the
questions necessary to address criticisms about quality and ethics of
mediation practices: (Part I) Is there a "mandate" to provide informal justice
through mediation? (Part II) Why challenge the generic mediation
mythology? (Part III) Does naming differences as 'styles' result in greater
clarity? (Part IV) Is mediation fulfilling its "mandate" to serve the court?
(Part V) What are the obstacles to changing the dominant discourse on
mediation? (Part VI) In answering these questions, an alternative framework
is proposed to shift the current discourse about generic mediation based on
artistry or style, to a discourse that identifies differences in mediation
models based on the norms referenced and the theories of conflict named.
(Part VII) In conclusion, mediation professionals are challenged to define
models of mediation that accurately differentiate a variety of mediation
practices, based on the norms referenced and the theories of conflict named.
I. IS THERE A MANDATE TO PROVIDE INFORMAL JUSTICE
THROUGH MEDIATION?
A. Understanding Mediation in a Historical Context
Informal legal processes implemented after the Civil War initiated a
shift away from the non-legal dispute settlement processes that traditionally
23. See generally Leonard Riskin, Understanding Mediators' Orientations, Strategies, and
Techniques: A Grid for the Perplexed, 1 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 7 (1996).
24. See generally Ellen Waldman, The Challenge of Certification: How to Ensure Mediator
Competence While Preserving Diversity, 30 U.S.F.L. REV. 723, 756 (1996) [hereinafter Waldman,
The Challenge of Certification]; Ellen Waldman, Identifying Social Norms in Mediation: A Multiple
Model Approach, 48 HASTINGS L.J., 703, 769 (1997) [hereinafter Waldman, Identifying Social
Norms].
25. Richard Birke, Evaluation and Facilitation: Moving Past Either/Or, 2000 J. DISP. RESOL.
309, 314, stating that "[mlediators tended to distill all differences into a stark evaluative-facilitative
dichotomy."
26. Birke, supra note 25, at 319, noting:
The debate about when to evaluate or facilitate, and how, is important. But it is not a
debate about whether to do one or the other, as every mediation of a legal dispute will
involve both. It is also not the only debate that needs to occur about mediation, and
perhaps not even the most important.
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provided community justice.27 Use of non-legal dispute resolution processes
was common in Native American cultures, 28 in many colonial American
communities, 29 and later in immigrant groups.3 ° In addition, the American
commercial sector has a longstanding and continuous preference for non-
legal dispute resolution processes.3 After the Civil War, in place of non-
legal processes that were integral to cohesive communities,3 2 the court
introduced informal legal processes.33  The introduction of informal
processes to increase judicial efficiency and control social unrest,3 4 was
directed in the latter part of the nineteenth century toward the labor
movement.
By the end of the nineteenth-century, in the name of reform, the courts
implemented a variety of newly established, informal mechanisms to gather
information and provide treatment.36 Mediation was one mechanism used to
27. See AUERBACH, supra note 9, at 57, stating that:
In the second half of the nineteenth century, the purposes (if not the forms) of alternative
dispute settlement were redefined ... Until the Civil War alternative dispute settlement
expressed an ideology of community justice. Thereafter, as it collapsed into an argument
for judicial efficiency, it became an external instrument of social control.
28. Philmer Bluehouse & James W. Zion, Hozhooji Naat'aanii: The Navajo Justice and
Harmony Ceremony 10 MEDIATION Q. 327 (1993).
29. See AUERBACH, supra note 9, at 46, stating that:
[A]s late as the beginning of the new nation in 1790, a New England town ordinance
required disputes to be submitted to a committee of 'three discreet freeholders.' Refusal
was considered to be 'unfriendly to the peace of the town;' the offending disputant would
be treated thereafter with 'contempt and neglect.'
30. See id. at 93, stating that "immigrants, like seventeenth-century colonists and nineteenth-
century utopians, retained an alternative vision of social organization: not merely an aggregation of
individuals but a community with shared values and commitments."
31. See id. at 43-44, stating that "[a]s the geographical, religious, and ideological boundaries
of community receded, commercial bonds were strengthened. Paradoxically, the pursuit of self-
interest and profit generated its own communitarian values."
32. See Bluehouse & Zion, supra note 28, at 329, noting "[t]he core of the common law of
most native peoples is the 'segmentary lineage system,' which is a method of tracing relationships
and adjusting disputes among people who are related to each other in various ways."
33. See AUERBACH, supra note 9, at 60, stating that "[t]he freedmen, shunted from law courts
to arbitration tribunals, discovered that they were powerless in both settings ... Neither legality nor
informality could remedy the effects of racial discrimination or economic inequality."
34. See Abel, supra note 17, stating that "[i]nformalism is a mechanism by which the state
extends its control so as to manage capital accumulation and diffuse the resistance this engenders."
35. See AUERBACH, supra note 9, at 65, stating that "[a]s long as labor remained the
malnourished child of the industrial family, the arbitration process would be controlled by its
domineering management parent. Compulsory arbitration in the blunt words of American
Federation of Labor president Samuel Gompers was 'industrial bondage."'
36. See HARRINGTON, supra note 12, at 53, stating that "[j]uvenile [c]ourts developed
investigative mechanisms to identify social facts about an individual and apply them in the
adjudication process. Probation and parole officers, social workers and psychopathic clinics were
6
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deal with the disruptions caused by labor disputes.3 7  Informal legal
processes were touted as the panacea for preventing violence.3" Notable
examples of informal dispute settlement processes include arbitration
tribunals used to address conflicts between freed slaves and their former
owners, 39 and industrial arbitration dealing with corporate-labor conflicts in
the attempt to quell widespread fear of class warfare. 40  Long before the
Pound Conference in 1976,41 corporate-labor mediators were trained and
employed by U.S. Government agencies. 42  These government agencies
43
used to diagnose the cause of delinquency. Individuals' dossiers served as the basis for treatment-
oriented disposition."
37. DEBORAH M. KOLB, THE MEDIATIORs 3 (1983), stating that "[i]n short, mediation is a
policy instrument intended to further the cause of industrial peace ... labor mediators serve as well
to channel the form of disputes, to restrain the power of competing interests, and so to preserve the
institutional fabric of the system."
38. See AUERBACH, supra note 9, at 64, stating that, "[i]ndustrial arbitration remained a
panacea offered by anxious middle-class professionals who felt dangerously squeezed between
capital and labor. Their fears of impending national cataclysm prompted their fervent advocacy of
arbitration as the only alternative to violent upheaval."
39. See id. at 59-60, stating that "[T]he imposition of alternative dispute settlement in the
Reconstruction South ultimately expressed the values of those who administered it, not the priorities
of those who were its intended beneficiaries. Blacks seldom participated as equals in either the
planning or implementation of the new dispute-settlement procedures."
40. See id. at 62.
41. See Della Noce, supra note 18, at 545, stating that:
The Pound Conference marked an important moment in the history of mediation: the
beginning of a concerted effort to stimulate court-connected mediation programs in the
United States by framing the contemporary mediation movement-projects then
underway in various countries, communities, agencies and courthouses-as a potential
remedy for the perceived popular dissatisfaction with the administration ofjustice.
42. See KOLB, supra note 37, at 2, stating that "The Erdman Act of 1898 marked the first time
that the federal government recognized mediation as a distinct mode of dealing with industrial
disputes. Since that time, the provision of mediation services by the government has been a
cornerstone of U.S. public policy on collective bargaining." "The Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service (FMCS), an independent federal agency, has jurisdiction over disputes in
industries engaged in interstate commerce, private non-profit health facilities, and agencies of the
federal government." Id. at 7.
43. See id. at 7-8, stating that:
The FMCS traces its roots to the U.S. Conciliation Service which was established in 1913
under the enabling legislation for the Department of Labor. One provision of the act
follows: 'The Secretary of Labor shall have the power to act as mediator and to appoint
commissioners of conciliation in labor disputes whenever in his judgment the interests of
industrial peace may require it to be done' (37 Stat.738# 8.29, USCA #51).
7
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spawned the notion of mediation, as a generic,44 value-free45 process. The
mediation process developed by the government's corporate-labor mediation
programs 46 (later identified as the problem-solving model)47 still dominates
the discourse on mediation,48 though it does not identify itself as a model or
make explicit its theoretical base.49
Roscoe Pound, a Harvard Law professor and critic of the legal system,
delivered a speech in 1906 detailing the deep and systemic failures of the
courts.5° Two of the remedies implemented in response to the crisis in the
legal system were conciliation and arbitration. Conciliation was intended to
provide access to the courts for people with limited financial means, and
whose cases dealt with relatively small claims. 5' Arbitration, consistently
preferred by business interests, was a way to preserve the self-regulation of
the business community.52 In effect, these two reforms created a "two-tier
justice system," in which conciliation was offered to those who could not
buy access to the courts, while arbitration gave businesses and corporations
44. See Wayne D. Brazil, Court ADR 25 Years After Pound: Have We Found A Better Way?,
18 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 93, 116 (2002), noting "[m]any (perhaps most) court programs offer
essentially only one process-a malleable, hybrid form of mediation."
45. See Dorothy Della Noce, Robert A. Baruch Bush & Joseph P. Folger, Clarifying the
Theoretical Underpinnings of Mediation: Implications for Practice and Policy, 3 PEPP. DISP. RESOL.
L.J. 39, 56 (2002), stating that:
The articulation of social theories is not simply an academic exercise that takes place in a
social vacuum. Theories, as explanations of social phenomena, are embedded in distinct
perspectives-fundamental beliefs and assumptions about the nature of human beings
and the nature of social interaction. Perspectives are ultimately tied to values, ideology,
and a preferred moral order.
46. See KOLB, supra note 37, at 4.
47. See Della Noce, Bush & Folger, supra note 45, at 48, stating that:
Bush and Folger argued that the problem-solving model of mediation was based upon an
essentially psychological/economic view of human conflict. According to this model,
conflict represents a problem in solving the parties' incompatible needs and interests.
Because a problem solved is a conflict resolved, the model presumes that a solution-
typically represented by a tangible settlement agreement-is 'what the parties want.'
48. Luiz Arturo Pinzan, The Production of Power and Knowledge in Mediation, 14
MEDIATION Q. 3, 14 (1996), stating that "[t]he colonization or taking over of mediation by the
economic apparatus is reflected in the fact that 'the language of problem-solving mediation contains
many of the same terms used to describe marketplace exchange: optimization, joint gains, gains from
exchange' (Bush and Folger, 1994, p.236)."
49. See Della Noce, Bush & Folger, supra note 45, at 49.
50. See AUERBACH, supra note 9, at 95.
51. See id. at 97, stating that "[c]onciliation was a reform offered by the legal community to a
marginal clientele; it was designed to resolve the claims of poor people who could not afford
counsel, and who were especially victimized by court congestion and delay."
52. See id. at 97, stating that "[a]rbitration, by contrast, expressed the preference of
commercial interests, especially in New York, for self-regulation untrammeled by the intrusion of
law and lawyers."
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protection from the courts.53  In essence, a historical pattern emerges in
which informal alternatives to litigation processes are endorsed by the legal
system when it comes under attack. 
5 4
In 1947, Congress passed the Taft-Hartley Amendment to the National
Labor Relations Act, which established the use of federally sponsored
mediation in collective bargaining." In 1976, Chief Justice Warren Burger
convened the Pound Conference: The National Conference on the Causes of
Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice (named for
Roscoe Pound's paper delivered in 190656). The result of the Pound
Conference was the introduction of mediation into General District, Juvenile
and Domestic Relations, and Circuit Courts. 57 The courts implemented
"alternative" dispute resolution processes, which functioned to preserve the
power of the legal system 58 and to remove those who challenged it.
59
B. Mediation's Current Context
Following the Pound Conference, the court program to implement
informalization 60 introduced mediation into neighborhoods 61 and families.
53. Seeid.at 101.
54. See HARRINGTON, supra note 12, at 9, stating that "[a]ttacks on courts are so common that
they have become an ordinary part of American political life. The ordinariness of complaints about
court explains, in part, why reformers have been able to mobilize general support for judicial
reforms."
55. See KOLB, supra note 37, at 8.
56. J. Clifford Wallace, Levin & Wheeler: The Pound Conference: Perspectives on Justice in
the Future, 80 MICH. L. REV. 592, 592 (1982).
57. See generally Della Noce, supra note 18.
58. See AUERBACH, supra note 9, at 144, stating that "[a]ltematives are designed to provide a
safety valve, to siphon discontent from the courts. With the danger of political confrontation
reduced, the ruling power of legal institutions is preserved, and the stability of the social system
reinforced."
59. See id. at 124, stating that:
Alternative dispute settlement.., was most enthusiastically prescribed for disadvantaged
citizens who only recently had begun to litigate successfully to protect and extend their
rights ... citizens disadvantaged in American society by race, class, age or national
origin-those who most needed legal rights and remedies-faced the prospect of reduced
possibilities for legal redress, in the name of increased access to justice and judicial
efficiency.
60. See HARRINGTON, supra note 12, at 3, making the link between informal neighborhood
justice and judicial management:
[T]he rise of judicial management in the Progressive period and the reconstruction of
court unification in the 1970's [resulted in] ... [s]pecialized informal tribunals [that]
9
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Thus, the "mandate" to provide informal justice was an extension of the
courts,62  endorsed by legal professionals who recognized the social
consequences of denying access to justice. 63  The court built the mediation
"mandate" on several assumptions: (1) that informal processes would answer
the dissatisfaction with the court by getting the parties to accept
responsibility; 64 (2) that a generic mediation process existed 65 in which
mediator differences are based on the personal artistry of the individual
mediator and the circumstances of each case; 66 (3) that the caseload and
financial burden on the courts would be lightened by use of alternative
dispute resolution volunteers; 67 and (4) that court interests and parties' self-
determination are served by referring parties to a process that theoretically
centralized judicial management over minor social conflicts ... The neighborhood justice
movement developed in the context of decentralized judicial supervision over minor
disputes.
61. See Richard Delgado, Chris Dunn, Pamela Brown, Helena Lee, & David Hubbert,
Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute
Resolution, 1985 WiS. L. REV., 1359, 1364, stating that:
In 1979, the Department of Justice opened three neighborhood justice centers-one each
in Atlanta, Kansas City, and Los Angeles-to handle criminal and civil disputes...
Since then, the number of community justice centers has been growing rapidly; as of
1983 more than 170 such centers were operating in 40 states.
62. See HOFRICHTER, supra note 14, at xiv, stating that:
The informal state is typified by an emphasis on cooperation and consensus,
participation, and privatization... [Tihe informal systems are forms of law, not isolated
spheres. They remain connected to the formal legal system and legal concepts. Both are
part of the state and rely on each other, even though the informal state creates an
appearance of autonomy.
63. See AUERBACH, supra note 9, at 117-18, stating that "[a]fter 1968, when simmering rage
exploded in urban ghettos blighted by poverty and racism, the justification for alternatives quickly
shifted. Informal mediation was now promoted as 'an alternative to violence,' designed especially to
coax civil rights activists and their angry ghetto constituencies from the streets to quieter
sanctuaries."
64. See Harrington & Merry, supra note 20, at 720, stating that:
Voluntary participation in mediation is viewed as enhancing the development of an
individual's capacity to take responsibility for his or her problems and work out
consensual agreements with others ... [T]he ideological project does not promise that
mediation will change power relations or transform communities, it only attempts to
make people happier where they are.
65. See Della Noce, Bush & Folger, supra note 45, at 59, stating that "[t]ypically policy
statements simply address 'mediation' in the generic, as if it is a unitary process."
66. See Susan Silbey, Mediation Mythology, 9 NEGOT. J. 349, 350 (1993), stating that:
[T]he mediation mythologists claim that mediation is informal, with no specified rules of
procedure. This informality or lack of a specifiable procedure conveys a sense that it is a
personal, individualized process adapted by the mediator and the parties to the unique
circumstances of the immediate situation, the particular parties and the dispute ...
67. See Harrington & Merry, supra note 20, at 719.
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guarantees a common experience of what mediation iS, 68 and what any
mediator will do.69
Based on the aforementioned assumptions, mediation training programs
are geared toward developing skills and techniques.7 ° In conjunction with
training, evaluation of mediator competence 7 is often a checklist of how
these techniques are performed.72 Research73 typically measures settlement
rates, 74 party satisfaction, and/or the quality of the outcomes.7 5  Ethical
standards--often addressed as separate from hands on training 76 -if
mentioning mediator style at all,7 7 continue to treat differences as primarily
68. See Della Noce, Bush & Folger, supra note 45, at 59, stating that:
[E]fforts to craft theory-free, value-free policy (or to interpret and enforce existing
policies in a theory-free, value-free way) are futile. The underlying theory and values
will emerge, because every policy that defines or limits mediation in any way is built on a
particular value-based vision of what mediation is and should be, and by its very
existence reproduces that vision.
69. See Brazil, supra note 44, at 115, stating that "[tihere also can be large gaps between the
ADR processes described in a court's rules and publications and the ADR processes that parties
actually experience in their cases."
70. See Della Noce, Bush & Folger, supra note 45, at 45.
71. See Harrington & Merry, supra note 20, at 731, stating that:
In local programs, the process of filtering out bad mediators and selecting good
mediators, who are then empowered to redefine practice, tends to draw in educated,
professional people and eliminate those with close ties to the community who find the
detached stance (i.e., the withholding ofjudgments about human behavior) unnatural.
72. Office of the Executive Secretary, Mentorship Guidelines for the Certification of Court-
Referred Mediators, SUPREME COURT OF VA., Oct., 2006,
http://www.courts.state.va.us/drs/certification-process/mentorship-guidelines.pdf.
73. See Austin Sarat, The "New Formalism " in Disputing and Dispute Processing, 21 LAW &
Soc'Y REV. 695, 707 (1988), stating that:
Those who conduct empirical research are imagined as allies who can help Goldberg,
Green, and Sander facilitate the utilization of nonjudicial dispute processing techniques.
Dispute Resolution assigns to social scientists a rather narrow project of implementation
research that will be captive of the political assumptions and commitments of the
alternative dispute resolution movement.
74. See Della Noce, supra note 18, at 548, stating that "[tihe primacy of case management
goals began to shape mediation practice and policy in significant ways. Settlement of a dispute
through a negotiated agreement, a tangible marker of case closure, became part of the definition of
mediation and a yardstick for success in mediation."
75. See Della Noce, Bush & Folger, supra note 45, at 44.
76. See Charles Pou, Jr., Enough Rules Already! Making Ethical Dispute Resolution a Reality,
DisP. RESOL. MAG., Winter 2004, at 20, stating that "[b]asic and advanced mediation training
programs should place systematic exploration of applicable codes much closer to the core of their
curricula."
77. See Department of Dispute Resolution Services, Standards of Ethics and Professional
Responsibility for Certified Mediators, VA. JUDICIAL SYSTEM,
11
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individual. Training that focuses on techniques to develop mediator skills,
essentially defines mediation practice as artistry.
78
Both the lack of research dealing with ethics and ideology in mediation
practice 79 and the dismissal of research indicating that mediators are
influencing the decision-making of parties, 80 make the claims of mediation
success suspect.81  A study of several programs showed that a core of
mediators are assigned most of the mediations.82 This core evolved through
a process of selecting those mediators who believed in and demonstrated
neutrality, as evidenced by their detachment.83 Thus, while claiming
mediation is a process that comes from and serves communities, mediators
who most represent these communities are frequently marginalized.84
http://www.courts.state.va.us/soe/soe.htm, stating that, "[tihe mediator shall also describe his style
and approach to mediation."
78. See Michael Lang, Out of the Rut and Into the Groove: Developing Excellence in Practice,
MEDIATE.COM, June, 2003, available at http://www.mediate.com/articles/langMI.cfm. While
promoting reflective practices, Lang's five-step process merely encourages practitioners to be
curious and to develop a hypothesis that they might then test out as the mediation progresses. Id.
He winds up concluding that with such reflection, the mediator will be more often "in the zone of
artistry." Id. His notion of theory is the rationale behind the use of different tools and strategies. Id.
Although he identifies his "relational" lens as opposed to his wife's (and co-mediator) "structural"
lens, in using reflective practice, Lang never asks mediators to reflect on a theory of what causes
conflict as the basis for reflecting on choice of interventions. Id. In reflective practice, mediators
are encouraged to reflect on a set of decisions, but what theory and research is referenced is again
anybody's guess. Id. Artistry is also the focus of Robert D. Benjamin. See generally Robert D.
Benjamin, Gut Instinct: A Mediator Prepares, FAMILY MEDIATION NEWS, Summer 2001, available
at http://www.mediate.com/articles/benjamin6.cfm at 2, discussing how "[t]he stroke of genius
occurs, and the mediator turns from being a novice to sophisticated practitioner when he or she
leaves the beaten path of received wisdom and allows their creative instinct to run free."
79. See Sara Cobb, Einsteinian Practice and Newtonian Discourse: An Ethical Crisis in
Mediation, 7 NEGOT. J. 87, 96 (1996), stating that:
The glaring absence of any research on ethical and ideological issues in mediation
practice is painfully apparent in this volume [Mediation Research, Kenneth Kressel and
Dean Pruitt, 1989] ... at present there are no discourses, vocabularies, metaphors or
communication theories complex enough to enable us to deal with these questions.
80. See Della Noce, Bush & Folger, supra note 45, at 44.
81. See, e.g.. infra note 305, listing a source which claims great success with mediation.
82. See Harrington & Merry, supra note 20, at 723, stating that, "[a] small fraction of the total
pool of mediators in these three programs, handled a disproportionate number of cases. These
mediators came to constitute an elite that, along with staff, defined good practice, evaluated other
mediators, trained new mediators, and occasionally moved into staffpositions themselves."
83. See id. at 730, stating that "[t]he process is defined as neutral and interpreted as requiring a
detached stance. Only those who can achieve this stance are likely to become core mediators."
84. See id., stating that:
Precisely because of their participation and membership in the community, it is difficult
for [those mediators] to assume the required detachment ... Consequently, those
mediators who are close to the community tend to be used less often in all of the
programs we have studied, despite the program staffs strong commitment to involve
community people.
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The language 85 used by the court when promoting mediation is based on
the assumptions that mediation is a value-free (impartial/fair) process,
86
practiced by trained mediators (neutrals),87 that belongs to the parties (self-
determination/autonomy),88 who come with the intention to negotiate (good
faith)8 9  as equals,90  and which responds to their individual 9'
(confidential/private),92 interests and needs. 93 These words and the concepts
85. See Cobb, supra note 79, at 99-100, stating that:
Existing discourses about practice, pulled from a Newtonian paradigm, assume that
language functions to represent the world, and thus, practitioners, judges, and scholars
can assume there is an objective position from which to participate in discourse without
shaping or contaminating the social processes they observe. Yet descriptions of
mediation practice inevitably document the role that language and meaning play in the
construction and transformation of disputes, pushing the field toward more Einsteinian
descriptions of mediation process.
86. See Sara Cobb & Janet Rifkin, Practice and Paradox: Deconstructing Neutrality in
Mediation, 16 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 35, 38 n. 12 (1991), stating that:
Mediation presumes both neutrality and objectivity as both epistemologically and
practically possible; however, together these concepts function recursively, invoking and
reconstituting each other: 'objectivity' (a reality independent of any observer) makes
possible 'neutrality' (the objective position from which one can participate in social
relations free of affiliation to any position).
87. See Alison Taylor, Concepts of Neutrality in Family Mediation: Contexts, Ethics,
Influence, and Transformative Process, 14 MEDIATION Q. 215, 216 (1997), stating that "[n]ot only is
the view of neutrality inextricably linked to the mediator's model of practice, it is tied as well to the
practitioner's view of self and role."
88. See Nancy A. Welsh, The Thinning Vision of Self-Determination in Court-Connected
Mediation: The Inevitable Price of Institutionalization?, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (2001),
stating that "the originally dominant vision of self-determination, which borrowed heavily from
concepts of party empowerment, is yielding to a different vision in the court-connected context.
Perhaps not surprisingly, this vision is more consistent with the culture of the courts."
89. See Kimberlee K. Kovach, Lawyer Ethics in Mediation: Time for a Requirement of Good
Faith, DIsP. RESOL. MAG., Winter 1997 at 9, 11, stating that "[p]rior criticism of good faith
directives is based on the lack of objective standards, and that a demonstration of good or bad faith is
dependent on one's state of mind."
90. See Sara Cobb, The Domestication of Violence in Mediation, 31 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 397,
432 (1997), stating that "[t]he presumption of equity erases differences in resources, status,
legitimacy, power, and physical strength."
91. See Joseph A. Scimecca, Theory and Alternative Dispute Resolution, in CONFLICT
RESOLUTION THEORY AND PRACTICE 211, 217 (Dennis J.D. Sandole & Hugo van der Merwe, eds.,
1993), stating that "ADR, like formal law, is embedded in individualism. As such, the fundamental
principle of individual responsibility is seen as the cause of the conflict."
92. See Fineman, supra note 16, at 762, stating that "mediation is in the first instance
designated as a superior process--one based on informality-that can therefore give full protection
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they represent are full of complexities, and may conflict with each other. 94
Parties, as well as many mediators, have little or no context for recognizing
how the principles of self-determination, impartiality, confidentiality,
neutrality, good faith, and equality, which are expressions of legal
protections or rights, 95 become transformed in mediation into prescriptions
for personalized behaviors. 
96
C. The "Mandate "for Mediation Comes From the Court
Inherited from the government's corporate-labor mediation program, the
generic problem-solving model replaces legal redress based on parties' rights
and responsibilities, 97 with the pursuit of resolving parties' individual needs
and interests.98 Representing informal processes99 as "alternatives"100 to the
law, rather than options within the law, denies the reality that the law is
93. See Cobb, supra note 90, at 410, stating that "[a]s Silbey and Sarat (1989) note, the
discourse of mediation (and more broadly ADR) constitutes needs and interests, as opposed to rights,
as the basis for evaluation and action."
94. See Della Noce, supra note 18, at 549, stating that "[t]he broad, inclusive statements of
abstract social values that appear in policy statements obscure the reality that some of those values
are in tension with each other. Achievement of one may only be possible at the expense of another.
Policy statements rarely acknowledge this tension and the inherent potential for goal conflict."
95. See STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND
POLITICAL CHANGE 58 (2d ed. 2004) stating that "[t]o claim a right is thus to invoke symbols of
legitimacy that transcend your personal problems. At the same time, you tacitly commit yourself to
accept the obligations which inhere in the existing system-that is to say, the pattern of mutual and
reciprocal commitments that defines the fabric of the society."
96. See HOFRICHTER, supra note 14, at 132-33 stating that "[lI]egal principle is translated into
psychological and personal terms, focusing on behavior rather than entitlement. Conflict becomes
private, excluded from public scrutiny and made irrelevant to public interest or, more directly, to a
class interest."
97. See Brazil, supra note 44, at 129, stating that:
Mediators are understood by many judges to subscribe passionately to a value system that
elevates the virtues of agreement, connection, and social peace above the virtues of
protecting rights or pursuing legal entitlements, and that mediators might tend to put
moral or social pressure on litigants to accept the same value system.
98. See Cobb, supra note 79, at 98-99, stating that "[t]he Code of Ethics for mediators.., fails
to define 'interests' and thus makes it impossible to comply with the instruction to balance power by
representing the interests of those whose interests may not be represented."
99. See id. at 2, stating that:
Informal processes are defined and understood in terms of what they are not; they are not
formal ... mediation theory and practice draw upon concepts central to formal processes,
concepts which confer legitimacy on the grounds of these borrowed forms of knowledge,
categories for understanding, and vocabularies for practice.
100. See Fineman, supra note 16, at 753, stating that "[t]he rhetoric employed criticized the
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always a reference point.1 0' If the "mandate" to improve case management
efficiency for the courts is being served, 10 2 it is questionable that the results
for parties are better than court decisions,'0 3 or that the community 0 4 is
actually empowered'0 5 by framing issues as individual and personal.'0 6
While parties may lack awareness regarding the role of mediation within the
law, 0 7 mediators often are aware that their practices do not conform with
101. See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Komhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The
Case of Divorce, 99 YALE L.J. 950, 968 (1979), stating that:
Divorcing parents do not bargain over the division of family wealth and custodial
prerogatives in a vacuum; they bargain in the shadow of the law. The legal rules
goveming alimony, child support, marital property, and custody give each parent certain
claims based on what each would get if the case went to trial.
102. See Della Noce, supra note 18, at 547, stating that "[w]hile any or all of the potential
social values claimed for mediation might have attracted the courts, the promise of improved case
management efficiencies appears to have propelled the interest in, and support for, court-connected
mediation."
103. See Silbey, supra note 66, at 352-53, stating that:
Repeated studies have shown, for example, that in divorce mediation, women
systematically come out with less financial support and smaller property settlements (see
e.g. Kelly and Gigy, 1989; Kelly and Hausman, 1988; Walker, 1992; and Ray and
Bohmer, 1992). Studies have also shown that the outcomes produced by mediation and
court processes are similar in cases involving minor disputes, small claims, and minor
criminal matters (Silbery, 1990).
104. See Stephanie Wildman, Democratic Community and Privilege: The Mandate for
Inclusive Education, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1429, 1430 (1987), stating that:
Community is a complicated idea. The classic concept of community seemed to refer to
residential communities. We retain this concept in the notion of neighborhoods, but in
modem life we often don't know the people who live two houses or two apartments down
from ours. In modem urban life we live in conditions of alienation and isolation,
yearning for connections and community. The nature of our potential communities has
changed.
105. See HOFRICHTER, supra note 14, at 131, stating that:
Ironically, whereas traditional notions of popular justice normally incorporate the
community context and social conditions in seeking a just outcome ... mediation
normally excludes such considerations... [T]he content of the conflict is divorced from
collective interests, segregated from similar cases, and limited to the immediate relations
between the disputants.
106. See Scimecca, supra note 91, at 217, stating that "[tihis focus [on individual
responsibility] enhances social control by not looking to structured inequalities in the society as the
reason for conflict. Grievances are trivialized and the basic social structure is rarely, if ever,
questioned."
107. See generally HARRINGTON, supra note 12.
15
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statements made in promoting mediation, but they fail to question the
mythology.'08
The court is the source of most referrals to mediation programs, and in
many states, exercises oversight of mediation and mediators.'0 9  The
endorsement of mediation and ADR through the courts conflates informal
legal processes with the role of traditional non-legal processes 0 that existed
in closely knit communities."' It is, therefore, incumbent upon mediation
scholars and practitioners to question the legitimacy 12 of mediation as it
carries out its role in serving the "mandate" of the court."1 3  In order to
answer the critics, mediation scholars have searched for frameworks other
than the generic problem-solving model.
108. See Waldman, Identifying Social Norms, supra note 24, at 757, stating that "[a]lthough the
mediators were aware that many of their behaviors undercut and exposed the cleavage between myth
and reality, this disjunction did not prompt them to question the myth's validity."
109. See, e.g. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.001-154.073 (Vernon 2008),
available at http://tlo2.tlc.state.tx.us/statutes/docs/CP/content/htm/cp.007.00.0001 54.00.htm; CAL.
EVID. CODE §§ 703.5, 1115, 1125-1128, 1152-1155 (West 2008) , available at
http://www.agreement.com/docs/CalifomiaMediationStatutes.pdf, CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §§664.6-
664.7 (West 2008), available at http://www.agreement.com/docs/CalifomiaMediationStatutes.pdf;
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.573 (West 2008) available at
http://consensus.fsu.edu/ADR/adr-statutes.html; FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 28.106.111 &
28.106.400-405 (2008),available at http://consensus.fsu.edu/ADR/adrstatutes.html;
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-576.4 to 8.01-581.26 (2008), available at
http://legI.state.va.us/000/lst/LS800320.HTML.
110. See AUERBACH, supra note 9, at 134-35, stating that "[t]he new urban mediation
alternatives contradicted virtually every prerequisite for informal justice that comparative
anthropology and American history provided. Communities played no role in their design or
implementation."
111. See id., stating that:
Once the fundamental attributes of social cohesion are missing, the substance of
mediation has been transformed, though its form is unchanged. Then, however, its
otherwise benign qualities endanger isolated individuals with minimal resources. The
weaker party, denied opportunity for legal redress, will be at an even greater
disadvantage as informality compounds inequality. At this point it becomes appropriate
to inquire whose interests mediation serves and whether it promotes or retards the ends of
justice that its proponents claim to pursue.
112. See id. at 144, stating that:
The ideal of equal justice is incompatible with the social realities of unequal wealth,
power, and opportunity, which no amount of legal formalism can disguise. In an unequal
society, the Haves usually are better served by legal formalism than the Have-Nots, a
disparity that creates a persistent legitimacy crisis.
113. See id. at 120, stating that "[t]he element of urgency that finally institutionalized
alternative dispute settlement in the 1970s came from within the legal system itself, where signs of
congenital breakdown were abundant."
16
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II. WHY CHALLENGE "ARTISTRY" AND THE GENERIC MEDIATION
MYTHOLOGY?
A. Mediation Scholarship and Research Document Mediator Influence/Bias
In the early 1980's, the broad claims made about the mediation process
began to be challenged by researchers. 1 14 Deborah Kolb in her observation
of two sets of mediators-one group of federal the other state mediators-
concluded that the more a mediator mediates, the more consistency is found
in how the mediator structures and manages the case." 5 In fact, Kolb states
that the mediator actually "imposes an order on the dynamics of the case
rather than discovers one." ''  Kolb later says, "Indeed, the process appears
to be more one of pattern and routine than it is of creativity and
innovation." 1 17 Further research bears this out:
[M]ediator style appeared to operate below the level of conscious awareness; style was
something mediators 'did' without fully recognizing the underlying coherence or 'logic'
behind their style. Mediators were capable of articulating why they adopted the style
they exhibited when their style was pointed out to them, but this took a conscious effort
and the assistance of other team members. 118
B. The Transformative Mediation Model Challenges the Dominant
Discourse
Robert A. Baruch Bush and Joseph P. Folger introduced and defined
transformative mediation in 1994 in their book, The Promise of
114. See Della Noce, supra note 18, at 552, stating that:
Researchers also began to assess the many claims made on behalf of the mediation
process ... Evidence began to accumulate that mediators were engaging in patterns of
practice that did not accord with the rhetoric of the field; that is, in the pursuit of
settlement, mediators were exerting influence in their sessions in ways that did not
demonstrate neutrality, did not honor party self-determination, and were sometimes even
coercive.
115. See KOLB, supra note 37, at 6.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 150.
118. Kenneth Kressel, Edward Frontera, Samuel Florenza, Frances Butler, & Linda Fish, The
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Mediation. "9 Bush and Folger challenged the rest of the mediation field to
define other models. 12  Making no claim to be the only viable model 12' of
mediation, transformative mediation proponents called for an articulation of
the theoretical bases for mediator interventions. 22  They contended that
clear definitions of the ideologies 2 3 on which distinct mediation practices
are founded, would insure that consent of the parties to mediation is based
on accurate information. 24  With the articulation of transformative
mediation theory in The Promise of Mediation in 1994, Bush and Folger
challenged the dominant discourse 125 of problem-solving mediation by
presenting another model, with a very different theoretical basis and,
therefore, a different goal. 126  In the transformative model, the mediator
theorizes that the parties care more about transforming the interaction than
about reaching settlement. 127  Success in this model is not measured by
settlement, but by increased responsiveness and positive interaction between
119. See generally BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 22.
120. See id. at 25, stating that "the mediation movement is diverse and pluralistic. Not all
mediators follow the practices described by any one story of the movement. Rather, there are
different approaches to mediation practice, with different and varied impacts .... "
121. Dorothy Della Noce, What Is A Model For Mediation Practice? A Critical Review of
Family Mediation: Contemporary Issues, 15 MEDIATION Q., Winter 1997, at 135-36, stating that
"model implies something more substantial than a practitioner's preference or idiosyncratic style. It
suggests an example of practice that is capable and worthy of imitation, a clear and detailed
exemplar to which a practitioner can refer for guidance."
122. See Della Noce, Bush, & Folger, supra note 45, at 40-41, stating that:
The impressive growth in the use of mediation in the U.S. stands in marked contrast to
the slower growth in the explanation and understanding of mediation practice. The
mediation field has been criticized by more than one scholar for its lack of an articulated
theoretical framework-a coherent explanation of the 'when and why' of mediator
intervention. Without such explanation, practitioners lack grounded guidance for their
interventions, and the mediation process is open to many criticisms.
123. See Harrington & Merry, supra note 20, at 711, stating that "[i]deology is not simply a set
of ideas or attitudes; it is constitutive in that it forms and shapes social relationships and practices.
Ideology contains symbolic resources that can be drawn on by groups who use their power to
promote their interests."
124. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Many Ways of Mediation: The Transformation of Traditions,
Ideologies, Paradigms, and Practices, 11 NEGOTIATION J. 217, 230 (1995), stating that "[a]s long as
the parties understand the roles and different approaches to mediation, an ideology of choice can be
satisfied. What becomes problematic is when the parties do not understand or agree to what they
actually receive."
125. See Fineman, supra note 16, at 736, stating that:
In order to become dominant, a discourse often must compete with other potentially
dominant discourses-it must exert control over the concepts and ideas that are
understood to be the foundation of the area. Language is the medium through which this
form of property is appropriated; the ideology and assumptions underlying it are bought
or sold by those with the ability to validate one discourse over another.
126. See BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 22.
127. See Della Noce, Bush & Folger, supra note 45, at 51.
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the parties, and a greater sense of empowerment of each party. 12 8 Inherent
in the transformative mediation model is the acknowledgment that the
mediator has influence. This influence is to be used in the service of
empowerment of the parties. 129
Transformative mediation theory and its implementation initiated a new
discourse in the mediation field, one in which differences in mediator
practices were tied to values and assumptions. 3 " Some scholars and
practitioners 131 welcomed this perspective, while it was rejected by others. 
32
Reasons for the resistance to the clarification of models based on their
theoretical underpinnings may range from unwanted practical
consequences,133 to inability to accept differences in the field. 134  More
significantly, this resistance has implications for policy in legislation,
regulation, training, and standards of ethics. 135
C. Riskin's Grid Looks for Rationales to Explain Mediator Decisions
Following Bush and Folger's lead, Leonard Riskin's 1996 article,
Understanding Mediators' Orientations, Strategies, and Techniques: A Grid
for the Perplexed, 136 presented an overview of the discourse among scholars
and professionals, and offered a "grid" for the purpose of identifying
differences in mediator practices. 137  The grid uses the terms "evaluative"
128. See id.
129. See BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 22, at 104-05.
130. See Della Noce, Bush & Folger, supra note 45, at 55.
131. See WINSLADE & MONK, supra note 4.
132. See Della Noce, Bush & Folger, supra note 45, at 57, stating that:
[O]ne incentive to deny value-based theoretical distinctions is that mediators may thereby
remain in the comfort zone of their lay theories, and avoid grappling with such thorny
issues as the inevitability of their own influence on the conflict, the value-based nature of
that influence, the value-based nature of differences among mediators, and the
implications of those differences for practice and policy.
133. See id. at 44, stating that:
It is apparently preferable to mediators, and even to some mediation experts, to protect
the mythical frame and disregard contrary research findings, than to accept the research
findings and risk being left without a frame of any kind. The myths are functional.
Mythology fills the void created by the absence of articulated theory by providing at least
some sort of 'intellectual and emotional scaffolding' for mediators.
134. See id. at 58.
135. Seeid. at59.
136. See Riskin, supra note 23.
137. See id.
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and "facilitative" to name two ends of a continuum that differentiates
mediator strategies and techniques. 3 8
In essence, Riskin addressed the artistry issue by attempting to show
that mediator practices were not mysteries, but explainable decisions; and he
proposed a solution. 139 Riskin's "grid" postulated that distinct functions of
evaluation and facilitation could be identified (and thereby the strategies and
techniques that would be used), in order to recognize differences in mediator
orientations. 10 Riskin named the problem: "Some of these processes have
little in common with one another. And there is no comprehensive or
widely-accepted system for identifying, describing, or classifying them."141
The confusion about different mediation processes has produced an
ongoing argument about whether mediators can evaluate the possible
outcomes in court, 142 what kind of cases are appropriate for mediation, 143
how to select and train mediators,144 what techniques are advisable, and
what responsibility the mediator has for the outcome.145  Riskin points out
that: "The confusion is especially pernicious because many people do not
recognize it; Or they claim that such forms [i.e. evaluation] do not truly
constitute mediation."'
146
Riskin's goal was to facilitate discussion, clarify arguments, and provide
"a system for categorizing and understanding approaches to mediation." '14
In the article, Riskin cites many of the categorizations and labels used by
scholars and practitioners to identify what a mediator will do. 148 Riskin uses
the terms orientation and approaches interchangeably to address
differences. 149
138. See id. at 23-24.
139. Seeid. at 11-12.
140. Seeid at26.
141. Id. at 8.
142. See id. at 9, stating that "[E]ffective mediation," claims lawyer-mediator Gerald S. Clay,
"almost always requires some analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of each party's position
should the dispute be arbitrated or litigated." But law school Dean James Alfini disagrees, arguing
that "lawyer-mediators should be prohibited from offering legal advice or evaluations." Formal
ethical standards have spoken neither clearly nor consistently on this issue.
143. See id. at 10.
144. See Waldman, Identifying Social Norms, supra note 24, at 759, stating that "[tihe
prerequisites for participation in the numerous state and federal court-annexed mediation programs
in existence reveal a complete lack of consensus on what training, experience, or academic
background best prepares an individual to mediate."
145. See Riskin, supra note 23.
146. Id. at 12.
147. Id. at 13.
148. Susan Oberman, Mediation Theory vs. Practice: What Are We Really Doing? Re-Solving A
Professional Conundrum, 20 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 775, 780-81 n. 17 (2005).
149. See Riskin, supra note 23, at 12-13.
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Riskin certainly succeeded in promoting discussion in the field
regarding identification of mediator differences. A plethora of articles
followed that address his grid. In a response to the controversy engendered
by the 1996 article, Riskin, in 2003, refines the terminology of his original
grid and offers up eight more grids.' 50 He did not endorse the adoption of
his "evaluative" and "facilitative" descriptors by many mediators and
mediation programs, as the way to inform parties of the style the mediator
would use. 15' In fact, Riskin goes so far as to say; "[L]abeling a mediator's
approach to the role of mediator as either facilitative or evaluative-which
offers convenience and perhaps a comforting belief that we can understand
what's going on-may obscure what's really going on."'15 2
D. Waldman's Categories Define Differences in Mediation Models Based on
the Norms Referenced
Another response to Bush and Folger's challenge was Ellen Waldman's
analysis, which names three categories of mediation that would distinguish
among models based on the norms they reference. '53 Waldman's categories
of mediation-Norm-Generating, Norm-Educating and Norm-
Advocating 4-- create another paradigm, one that furthers identification of
differences in mediation practices 5 5 and provides a frame for identifying the
theory of conflict on which each model rests. 56  Based on Waldman's
150. Leonard Riskin, Decisionmaking in Mediation: The New Old Grid and the New Nev Grid
System, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 3-4 (2003).
151. Id. at 13-14, stating that:
Some commentators have dealt with facilitation and evaluation as if they were
alternatives, treating the continuum-on which I said many mediators move around-like
a dichotomy. And many commentators employed these concepts as if they were real and
represented actual orientations toward practice and they routinely distinguished between
"facilitative mediation" and "evaluative mediation."
152. Id. at 17.
153. See generally Waldman, The Challenge of Certification, supra note 24; see also Waldman,
Identifying Social Norms, supra note 24.
154. Waldman, The Challenge of Certification, supra note 24, at 729, stating that "[t]his
typology identifies three mediation models: norm-generating, norm-educating, and norm-
advocating."
155. See Oberman, supra note 148, at 778, stating that "[w]ithin this framework, mediators can
choose from a range of tools and strategies and specify differences in models. The multiple issues
and decisions the mediator encounters are addressed by looking at the parameters of each mediation:
What norms are being referenced?"
156. See Della Noce, Bush & Folger, supra note 45, at 48, stating that:
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framework, a comparison of models157 would look at "theory of conflict,
empowerment of parties, basis of authority of the mediator, control of the
process, and definition of success." '158 Waldman's categories are not rigidly
exclusive; For example, an agreement to mediate that presents legal
parameters should be used in all cases. Adoption of Waldman's framework
allows for a wide range of models, including those that reference the law
and/or other social norms. Waldman's categories expand definitions of
mediation beyond generic mediation, offering legitimacy to a range of
models. 159
Norm-Generating Mediation applies to any mediation in
which the parties reference primarily their own values and
standards. While all mediation operates "in the shadow of the
law," Norm-Generating models focus the attention on the
interpersonal issues.
Norm-Educating Mediation is based on the theory that
people who are well-informed make better decisions. While
guided by their own values, participants will also gather all
relevant information throughout the mediation process. In
addition, they are encouraged to learn skills of negotiation for
use outside the mediation.
Norm-Advocating Mediation is any mediation in which
legal statutes or institutional regulations dictate the parameters
of the mediation agreement. Parties must be informed of these
restrictions prior to and throughout the mediation. 160
Each model of mediation practice assumes a particular view of the nature of conflict,
which in turn is built upon and reflects the underlying values and assumptions of a
particular ideology. Bush and Folger... argued that a mediator's preferred framework
for practice was less a matter of situational strategy or personal style than it was a matter
of his or her fundamental ideology.
157. See Waldman, The Challenge of Certification, supra note 24, at 728, stating that "the
credentialed mediators of the future should be well-equipped to diagnose which meditative model is
appropriate and assess their own competence in delivering services according to that model."
158. See Oberman, supra note 148, at 778-79, 822 app. A.
159. See Waldman, The Challenge of Certification, supra note 24, at 748, noting that in the
view of "[m]any mediation theorists . . .,the norm-generating model represents the only true or
'good' mediation." See also Donald Weckstein, In Praise of Party Empowerment-And of Mediator
Activism, 33 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 501, 504 (1997), stating that "any attempt to limit true mediation
to facilitative or 'norm-generating' mediation is inconsistent with the predominant practice, the
societal function of mediation, its historical roots, and a mediator's ethical responsibilities."
160. See Oberman, supra note 148, at 787.
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Prior to the publication of Waldman's framework, existing analyses
failed to clarify differences in the range of practices being called
mediation. 161 After Waldman's framework was published, few scholars
acknowledged or recognized its potential 6 2 to both clarify real differences,
and include a full spectrum of practices. Waldman's elegant framework
allows transparency about the decisions mediators make, and supports
parties' self-determination by asking: what norms are being referenced?
Those choosing to offer norm-generating mediation models would function
primarily without reference to external social norms. Those choosing either
norm-educating or norm-advocating models would include reference to
external norms in their practice of mediation. 163
E. Scholars Agree There Are Real Differences in Mediator Practices, but
Disagree on How to Deal With Them
Some of Riskin's critics address problems with the facilitative vs.
evaluative categorization, while others protest the limitation it places on the
mediator's ability to go beyond any either/or category. 16 Riskin himself
maintains that the more flexibility a mediator can demonstrate, the better. 65
This debate has left us with some mediators using "evaluative" and
"facilitative" categories in an attempt to meet standards requiring mediators
161. Michael Moffitt, Casting Light on the Black Box of Mediation: Should Mediators Make
Their Conduct More Transparent?,13 OHIO ST. J. ON DiSP. RESOL. 1, 5 (1997), stating that "[o]ne
likely reason why none of these models has yet been universally embraced by the mediation
community is that none of the proposed typologies adequately describes or guides mediators through
the range of difficult decisions they must make during a mediation."
162. See Weckstein, supra note 159, at 505. Weckstein chooses Waldman's categories as one
of three significant analyses emerging from the many attempts to find clarity in defining differences
in mediation practices. Id. Riskin in his 2003 article acknowledges that Waldman's categories do
not fit within his framework, but makes no attempt to reconcile the two. See Riskin, supra note 150,
at 24 n.93.
163. See Waldman, The Challenge of Certification, supra note 24, at 755.
164. See Moffitt, supra note 161, at 4-5.
165. See Riskin, supra note 150, at 32, stating that:
First, the very idea of an overall orientation could imply, to some, a kind of rigidity in a
mediator, an unwillingness to respond to circumstances. Thus it may impair the
mediator's ability, and that of the parties and their lawyers, to approach situations with an
open mind. Second, as demonstrated above in connection with the old grid, it is nearly
impossible-and generally unwise-to label a particular mediator with an overall
orientation.
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to define their styles, 16 6 while others maintain that these distinctions cause
unnecessary divisions in the profession 167 and add little to either parties' or
mediator's understanding of what will take place. 68  Still others declare the
effort to distinguish between methods to be unrealistic and impractical.
169
One proclaims: "the 'war' is over and eclectic mediation has carried the
day."'' 70  In yet another argument, mediators are encouraged to integrate
frameworks.' 7' Critics of the transformative model have seen it as grandiose
or irrelevant to the consumer. 1
72
The challenge presented by Bush and Folger, Riskin, Waldman, and
others 173 to accurately identify real differences in mediation theory and
practice 174 is ignored by continuing to frame the discourse as a choice
between evaluation or facilitation. The ongoing debate between evaluative
vs. facilitative (or directive vs. elicitive) 75 is no longer productive and
certainly not the only important issue to be addressed. 176  Naming 77 "the
166. See Department of Dispute Resolution Services, supra note 77. Despite this directive that
the mediator must disclose his (or her) style to the parties, in the Mentorship Guidelines for the
Certification of Court-Referred Mediators, the mentor is never required to explain his or her style to
the mentee. Office of the Executive Secretary, supra note 72. The guidelines merely require, in
section Ill. 1.5, that the mentor must "[i]nform the mentee that he or she must seek mentorship with
more than one Mentor in order to receive a variety of feedback and to experience more than one
mediator style." Id.
167. See Birke, supra note 25, at 309, stating that:
This [Riskin, 1996] article sparked an enormous amount of debate among practitioners
and academics. Practitioners split into two camps, one composed of those who identified
themselves as evaluative mediators and the other who called themselves facilitative
mediators. Many academics took positions in the debate, and the net effect was a
polarization of the field. This four year-old split had educational value when it was first
announced, but the polarizing effect has eclipsed the educational value. The time has
come to put this debate to rest.
168. Seeid. at 319.
169. See Stemple, supra note 2, at 383.
170. Id. at 388.
171. See Cheryl A. Picard, Exploring an Integrative Framework for Understanding Mediation,
21 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 295, 309, concluding that "the mediation community can no longer continue
along the road of binary thinking. Instead, it is challenged to find a more integral, more holistic, and
more inclusive view of its work. The key word here is integral, meaning to bring together the range
of mediation ideologies."
172. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 124, at 240, stating that "[t]he grandiose claims made on
behalf of mediation have had to be more modestly stated as the analyses and evaluations of work
have demonstrated that parties do not always share the transformative visions of the mediators-they
just want their problems solved."
173. See Scimecca, supra note 91.
174. See Della Noce, Bush & Folger supra note 45, at 56, stating that "practitioners accept that
differences among themselves exist at the level of 'style' of practice, but deny that these differences
exist at the level of theory, values or ideology."
175. See Riskin, supra note 150, at 20.
176. See Birke, supra note 25, at 319.
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problem" as evaluative vs. facilitative prevents consideration of other
paradigms'78 that might clarify differences in mediator practices. The
challenge to articulate the theoretical basis of differences in mediation
practice introduced by Bush and Folger, and furthered by Riskin, was
answered by Waldman. However, despite the extensive research and
scholarship, little appears to have changed in the design of training,
79
establishment of ethical standards, 180 or evaluation mechanisms' 8' of
177. See EDELMAN, supra note 8, at 29, stating that "[hlow the problem is named involves
alternative scenarios, each with its own facts, value judgments, and emotions."
178. See BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 22, at 3, stating that:
Scholars and thinkers in many fields have begun to articulate and advocate a major shift
in moral and political vision-a paradigm shift-from an individualistic to a relational
conception. They argue that, although the individualist ethic of modem Western culture
was a great advance over the preceding caste-oriented feudal order, it is now possible and
necessary to go still further and to achieve a full integration of individual freedom and
social conscience, in a relational social order enacted through new forms of social
processes and institutions.
179. See Pou, Jr., supra note, 76 at 20, stating that:
Many basic training programs treat ethics as a fortieth-hour afterthought. ADR
practitioners often are not especially aware of, or thoughtful about, ethical standards.
Numerous program administrators complain that trainers often are reticent about taking
positions, and that a good percentage of neutrals do not recognize when an ethics issue
arises.
180. In comparing the standards of practice from the Texas Association of Mediations, with
The Standards of Practice for California Mediators, The Model Standards of Conduct for Mediations
(which have been adopted by the American Arbitration Association, the American Bar Association,
and the Association for Conflict Resolution), and the Standards of Ethics and Professional
Responsibility for Certified Mediators, Supreme Court of Virginia, in only two places is there any
mention of mediator style, approach, or orientation. See generally Texas Association of Mediators,
Standards of Practice for Mediators, May, 2003, http://www.txmediator.org/TAM%20SOP.pdf,
California Dispute Resolution Council, Standards of Practice for California Mediators,
MEDIATE.COM, Aug., 2000, http://www.mediate.com/articles/cdrcstds.cfm; American Arbitration
Association, American Bar Association & Association for Conflict Resolution, Model Standards of
Conduct for Mediators, Sept., 2005,
http://www.abanet.org/dispute/documents/model-standardsconduct april2007.pdf; Department of
Dispute Resolution Services, supra note 77. Only the Virginia Standards of Ethics and Professional
Responsibility for Certified Mediators requires the mediator to make his or her style explicit.
Department of Dispute Resolution Services, supra note 77. In the Model Standards of Conduct
Section IV. 3. it requires the mediator merely to "have available for the parties information relevant
to the mediator's training, education, experience and approach to conducting a mediation." Id. Thus
whether generated by the court or a professional organization in the efforts to regulate and certify
mediators, the assumption of a generic process persists. Id.
181. See Brazil, supra note 44, at 146-47, stating that:
One source of concern is a pattern I have noticed in responses to some surveys that ask
parties, lawyers, and neutrals to report what occurred at an ADR session and to assess the
25
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mediation. Naming the differences in what mediators do as facilitative vs.
evaluative and identifying these strategies as styles, approaches, or
orientations, for all intents and purposes obscures mediator bias. From a
social constructionist perspective, 8 2 this dominant discourse within the
mediation community avoids a discourse on models that identifies the norms
each references and the theories on which each is built.'83
III. HOW DOES NAMING "DIFFERENCES" AS "STYLES" FUNCTION
AS A PROTECTION OF MEDIATOR BIAS?
A. Eclectic Mediation is the Same as "Artistry"
A significant amount of scholarship and research contradicts the
presentation of mediation by the courts as a generic process. Thus, it would
seem fair to say that scholars and practitioners would agree: there are
important differences in what mediators do. Riskin's 1996 article made the
confusion about what mediators are doing visible. However, the persistent
use of his terms "evaluative" and "facilitative" as differentiating mediator
styles has resulted in a ten-year debate in the field that misses the point.
Even those arguing against an either/or paradigm, often still accept these
terms as defining the range of mediator practices. 184 Even if there was
agreement that mediators neither facilitate nor evaluate exclusively, would
the only other conclusion be that all mediators are eclectic: picking and
choosing whatever works at the moment?' 85 Isn't concluding that eclectic
mediation is "the" reality, and naming differences as style a perpetuation of
the original position of mediation as artistry?
contributions the ADR process made. In this pattern.., the reports from the neutrals are
consistently much more favorable than the reports from the lawyers or the parties.
182. See WINSLADE & MONK, supra note 4, at 38, stating that:
All knowledge is derived from a perspective. Perspectives are relative to particular
cultural or social versions of reality. In this sense, knowledge can never be final and is
relative to time and place and to the social landscape out of which it has been produced.
The position from which something is viewed is as important as the object being viewed
in the construction of a particular reality.
183. See Pinzan, supra note 48, at 13 stating that "[a] pre-supposed 'hidden knowledge' of
mediation, garnished with countless judicial terms that alienate the ordinary citizen, are frequently
the most ingenious smoke screen to hide an abysmal ignorance of the theory and practice of
mediation."
184. See Stemple, supra note 2, at 377. Even while Stemple argues for eclecticism, he attempts
to categorize what kinds of cases lend themselves to facilitation and which to evaluation. Id.
185. See id. at 383, stating that "[d]espite state statutes defining mediation as facilitative and
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In the problem-solving model the cause of conflict is seen as the
incompatible needs and interests 18 6 of the parties.' 87  The stated goal of the
problem-solving model is to reach fair and tangible settlements.
188
Mediators present themselves as "impartial neutrals who have no authority
and no wish to impose their views on disputing parties."' 189 Mediators claim
to be free of any motive or bias. 90 In the problem-solving perspective,
because each case and situation is seen as different, mediators claim to ply
their trade in a way that is specific to each set of circumstances.191 By this
definition, the problem-solving model thus bases its effectiveness 192 on the
mediator's individual artistry. 193
It should, therefore, come as no surprise that mediators often
characterize what they do as artistry.194  The claim to artistry produces a
mysteriousness (some have called it "the magic of mediation"), 195 in which
186. See Cobb, supra note 79.
187. See Della Noce, Bush & Folger, supra note 45, at 49, stating that "[b]ecause a problem
solved is a conflict resolved, the model presumes that a solution-typically represented by a tangible
settlement agreement-is 'what the parties want."'
188. See id.
189. See id. at 43.
190. See Elizabeth A. Moreno, The Mediator's Role: Tackling the Illusion of Objectivity,
LABORING RESULTS, March 2004, available at http://www.mediate.com/articles/morenoEl.cfm,
stating:
Researchers of studies conducted by Stanford University, have concluded that even when
we think we are compensating for our bias, it is not something we can easily remove or
factor out of our decisions because it operates unconsciously. We are far better at
spotting bias in others than in ourselves.
191. See KOLB, supra note, 37 at 3, stating that "[t]he artistry of mediation stems, then, from
the mediator's ability to analyze and then smoothly to handle unique circumstances as they arise."
192. Jeanne M. Breit, Rita Drieghe, & Debra L. Shapiro, Mediation Style and Mediation
Effectiveness, 2 NEG. J. 277, 278 (1986), stating that "[i]t is impossible to evaluate the effectiveness
of mediation, since there is no criterion for failure."
193. See KOLB, supra note 37, at 4, stating that:
Given the uniqueness of case situations that they must analyze and remedy, it is evident
that no two mediators can compare their approaches on the basis of the same set of facts.
Consequently, the development of each mediator's approach or style is always shaped by
experiences that are highly personalized and differ from those of his colleagues.
194. See id. at 3, quoting a noted practitioner:
The task of the mediator is not an easy one. The sea that he sails is only roughly charted
and its changing contours are not clearly discernible. Worse still, he has no science of
navigation, no fund inherited from the experience of others. He is a solitary artist,
recognizing at most, a few guiding stars and depending on his personal powers of
divination.
195. See Moffitt, supra note 161, at 6, noting:
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every case is unique and each mediator is unique, and therefore he or she
cannot predict what tools and strategies will be needed. 96  Use of the
artistry description along with the generic or problem-solving model has
dominated the discourse on mediation, making it impossible to predict or
define what any mediator will do in any given situation. If mediation skill is
due to artistry, then training is superfluous.197  In addition, defining what
mediators do as artistry places mediators beyond the scope of public
scrutiny and accountability.'98 How can it be determined that a mediator has
"crossed a line," if there is no line drawn at the outset?' 99
B. The "Artistry" Definition Obscures the Connection to the Law
Thus, the artistry explanation leaves the door wide open for critics who
make compelling arguments that mediation, while claiming to replace
hierarchical legal relationships 00 with self-determination of the parties, in
fact furthers the role of the court as a mechanism of socialization.20 ' In the
name of cooperation and preservation of personal autonomy and privacy,0 2
Many Mediators and scholars treat mediation within any model as if it were a black box
or a kind of magic show in which the mediator "does her thing" for or to the participants
without explaining what "her thing" is or how or why it is expected to work. Indeed,
some mediators treat their role like that of a magician's, avoiding explanations as if they
were secrets that would ruin the effects of their efforts.
196. See KOLB, supra note 37, at 4.
197. See Breit, Drieghe, & Shapiro, supra note 192, at 278, stating that "[t]he mediator-cum-
artist view implies that mediation skills cannot easily be acquired through training; mediators are
born not made, according to this viewpoint."
198. See KOLB, supra note 37, at 4.
199. See Fineman supra note 16, at 754, stating that:
The use of rhetorical devices serves the institutional interests of those in the mediation
business who wish to stake out an area for their own control. Their language, which is
cast as neutral and professional, is political. This fact has been obscured, however,
because their rhetoric has confined the debate to a procedural level.
200. George Pavlich, The Power of Community Mediation: Government and Formation of Self-
Identity, 30 LAW & SOC'Y REv. 707, 711 (1996), stating that "early critics of the alternative dispute
resolution proposals have argued that far from restricting state control over individual lives, of
empowering and liberating individual disputants, community mediation programs actually expand
and intensify state control."
201. See Christine B. Harrington, Delegalization Reform Movements: A Historical Analysis, in
THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE VOLUME 1: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE, supra note 17, at 43,
stating that "[p]ound argued for the 'socialization of law' in order to 'secure social interests in the
modem city' (1913: 311). By this he meant that laws had to be created by society 'to protect men
from themselves. . . .' The scope of judicial administration would be enlarged by the 'socialization
of law."'
202. See HOFRICHTER, supra note, 14, at xiv.
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mediation and other alternative dispute resolution forms invisibly 2 3 or
informally represent the state as embodied in the law.2 °4  Presentation of
Alternative Dispute Resolution as generic and value-free distorts the reality
that these processes are descended from and imposed by the court as
extensions of the law. Indeed, the complex relationship between mediation
and law is apparent when the authority of the court is on one hand invoked
by mediators to give themselves legitimacy, 2°5 and on the other portrayed as
an undesirable alternative.20 6
C. Use of the Label "Style" Does Not Clarify Differences in Mediator
Practices
Use of the word style2 7 became a frequent choice for acknowledging
differences 20 8 in mediator practices 2 9 in the effort to answer the critiques of
203. See id. at 30-31, stating that "[i]f we understand the state as a system of social relations
that create order and maintain the rule of capital, we can begin to explore the way in which order is
created in everyday life, absent the visible presence of state apparatus ...."
204. See id. at 47, stating that "[l]egal relations, as an element of state power, are embedded in
reproducing the social order of capitalism and cannot be understood fully apart from this element.
Law embodies and articulates class relations ...."
205. See Fineman, supra note 16, at 764-65, stating that "[t]he political victory of the helping
professions is manifested by the conferring of legally significant rights and obligations, through the
explicit delegation of decisionmaking authority to the social workers and mediators."
206. Susan Silbey & Sally E. Merry, Mediator Settlement Strategies, 8 LAW & POL'Y 7, 13
(1986), stating that:
Mediators in the court-based program stress that going to court is time-consuming and
expensive... They emphasize loss of control and possible arbitrariness of the court...
offered at the same time that the mediators seek to legitimize themselves and the
outcomes of mediation through association with the court.
207. The words approach and orientation are often used synonymously with style, and in some
states have been incorporated into ethical guidelines. See, e.g., Department of Dispute Resolution
Services, supra note 77, which in Section D. I.c. provides:
The mediator shall also describe his style and approach to mediation. The parties must be
given an opportunity to express their expectations regarding the conduct of the mediation
process. The parties and mediator must include in the agreement to mediate a general
statement regarding the mediator's style and approach to mediation to which the parties
have agreed.
208. See Birke, supra note 25, at 314, stating that "Professor Riskin's influential article ...
showed that mediation was not all alike, he gave the public a tool to distinguish between them, and
he gave mediators a tool to distinguish themselves from their competitors."
209. See Kressel, et al., supra note 118, at 68, noting "[i]t has been observed for some time that
mediators do indeed have stylistic preferences (Kolb, 1983; Silbey and Merry, 1986; Susskind &
Ozawa, 1985; Vanderkooi & Pearson, 1983)."
29
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mediation, and to distance from the artistry definition. However, style as a
formulation for recognizing differences continues to obscure them,2 '0 and
makes it impossible for consumers to know what process they will
encounter.2 11  Current descriptions of mediator styles do not provide
accurate distinctions among mediation practices.212 While perhaps serving
the court by perpetuating the myth of generic mediation, the confusion does
not serve the profession or the public.213 Lack of clarity about mediation
models214 calls the promise of self-determination into question.215
Labeling differences in mediation practices as mediator style, in the
attempt to refute the artistry description, resulted in widespread acceptance
of categories based on Riskin's grid as either evaluative or facilitative. The
continued focus on Riskin's identification of evaluative and facilitative
strategies as descriptors of style has prevented other significant issues from
being raised.21 6
D. Names Define Reality
The ability to create language is perhaps the most uniquely human
211trait. It distinguishes humans from their mammalian cousins. It provides
210. Dorothy Della Noce, Mediation Policy: Theory Matters, VA. MEDIATION NETWORK
NEWS, July, 1999 at 4, stating that "[i]t ["style"] appears to be consistent with the rhetoric of
mediator neutrality, which has somehow come to mean that mediators have no plan, no values, no
agenda, no goal, no premises, and no theory beyond doing the clients' bidding."
211. See Waldman, Identifying Social Norms, supra note 24, at 769, noting "[i]f mediators, like
most professionals, are expected to obtain informed consent to their interventions, they can do so
only by providing thoughtful and accurate information about the process."
212. See Abel, supra note, 17 at 9, stating that "they stress superficial stylistic differences
between informal and formal institutions-dress, manner, speech, location, hours-in order to
conceal the fundamental similarities of substance."
213. Waldman, Identifying Social Norms, supra note 24, at 707, stating that:
Although the mediation literature is rich with "thick descriptions" of various mediator
styles, it lacks a theoretical framework that takes adequate account of the disparate role
social norms play in different mediation models. This conceptual gap hinders our efforts
to construct meaningful professional standards, and impedes both practitioner and client
understanding of what mediation entails.
214. See Della Noce, supra note 121.
215. Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Informed Consent in Mediation: A Guiding Principle for
Truly Educated Decisionmaking, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 775, 777 (1999), stating that
"[u]nderlying the consent and empowerment rhetoric is a central inquiry: what does informed
consent require in mediation? Unlike the concept of informed consent in the physician-patient and
attomey-client relationships, the meaning of informed consent in mediation practice has received
little attention."
216. See Birke, supra note 25.
217. See Edelman, supra note 8, at 58, stating that "[l]anguage is the distinctive characteristic
of human beings. Without it we could not symbolize; we could not reason, remember, anticipate,
rationalize, distort, and evoke beliefs and perceptions about matters not immediately before us."
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a tool to organize and categorize things, to point out objects that are visible,
and to refer to things that are invisible: allowing for the formulation of
abstractions. But language is not just a tool for identifying material objects;
It always exists within a social context.21 8 For example, looking at the word
immigrant would give us a picture of the complexities of context in what
might seem to be simple or straightforward words.
An immigrant is someone who has left their country of origin and
legally entered another country. This word is likely to evoke images of the
waves of U.S. immigrants, many of whom experienced prejudice and
discrimination until being assimilated into the culture. Still, these
immigrants had legal status and many became proud U.S. citizens.
Coexisting with these images, what is masked by the word immigrant in
U.S. culture, is the fact that other than Native Americans, we are all
descended from immigrants (though the seventeenth and eighteenth century
Europeans came as colonists and by using that label, escaped identification
with and as immigrants). And while most immigrants came willingly to the
U.S., many of African descent were brought against their will, as slaves.
Japanese immigrants, some of whom served in the U.S. military and many of
whom became U.S. citizens, were put in prison camps or deported during
WW II. As immigrants/colonizers, Europeans conquered and appropriated
land already occupied by Native Americans, and then committed legally
sanctioned genocide 1 9 to maintain possession of it. When we hear current
discussions of the "problem" of immigration, all these contexts or realities
are being referenced, although the theft of land and resources and the crimes
against humanity are rarely, if ever, mentioned.
218. See id., noting:
Language is always an intrinsic part of some particular social situation; it is never an
independent instrument or simply a tool for description. By naively perceiving it as a
tool, we mask its profound part in creating social relationships and in evoking the roles
and the 'selves' of those involved in the relationships.
219. See WARD CHURCHILL, A LITTLE MATTER OF GENOCIDE: HOLOCAUST AND DENIAL IN
THE AMERICAS 1492 TO THE PRESENT 70 (1997), quoting Raphael Lemkin's definition of genocide:
Generally speaking, genocide does not necessarily mean the immediate destruction of a
nation, except when accomplished by mass killings of all members of a nation. It is
intended rather to signify a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction
of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the
groups themselves [even if all the individuals within the dissolved groups physically
survive].
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A Foucaultian analysis of language, specifically of the law22° and
mediation as an option within the law, makes the connection between
language and the reality of people's everyday lives: words frame
thoughts. 22 1 In a Foucaultian perspective, "the dominance 22 of a particular
discourse inevitably reflects the power structure of society. 223 For example,
using the word "terrorists" defines the discourse quite differently than if
replaced by "freedom fighters." Contrary to the old adage: "sticks and
stones may break your bones but names will never hurt you," names can be
damaging224-so much so that preventing further harm, makes some words
unutterable. Even when names are not purposefully used to hurt,225 a name
is a symbol that represents an idea, belief, and/or perception. The symbolic
aspect of a label goes beyond mere identification of an object; it creates a
reality.2
26
The artistry and generic mediation descriptions create a reality that
actually predicts very little about what a mediator will do.227 If the parties
do not understand the process to which they are agreeing, self-determination
is in jeopardy.228 Similarly, the continued use of the word style,229 (or
220. CONLEY & O'BARR, supra note 3, at 2, stating that "[t]his research looks at the law's
language in order to understand the law's power. Its premise is that power is not a distant
abstraction but rather an everyday reality ... To the extent that power is realized, exercised, abused
or challenged, the means are primarily linguistic."
221. See id. at 7, stating that:
Discourse in Foucault's sense is not simply the task itself, but also the way that
something gets talked about. Logically, the way people talk about an issiue is intimately
related to the way that they think about it and ultimately act with respect to it. Discourse
is thus a locus of power.
222. See id., stating that "the repeated playing out of the dominant discourse reinforces th[e]
structure. Discourse, as Foucault put it in The History of Sexuality, 'can be both an instrument and
an effect of power....
223. Id.
224. See MARSHALL ROSENBERG, NONVIOLENT COMMUNICATION: A LANGUAGE OF
COMPASSION (2001).
225. Id. at 2, stating that "[w]hile we may not consider the way we talk to be 'violent,' our
words often lead to hurt and pain, whether for ourselves or others."
226. See CONLEY & O'BARR, supra note 3, at 2, stating that "we not only describe reality but
create our own realities... "
227. See Kressel et al., supra note 118, at 81, stating that "[w]ithout a clear professional
consensus on the parameters of the role, it is perhaps understandable that mediator behavior will be
vulnerable to shaping by the situational pressures . ..."
228. See Welsh, supra note 88, at 92-93, stating that:
Self-determination has been identified as the fundamental core characteristic of the
mediation process. Nevertheless... the existence and meaning of self-determination
cannot be taken for granted. Indeed current trends in the institutionalization of court-
connected mediation are challenging courts and mediation advocates to clarify the
meaning of "self-determination" and to develop effective mechanisms to protect it.
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orientation/approach) used in scholarly articles and in some instances in
ethical guidelines and statutes 230 is inadequate as the conceptualization of
mediator differences. The dictionary definition of style231 gives a range of
meanings including: expression, performance, good taste, comfortable mode
of living, fashion, the gnomon of a sundial, and a pointed writing instrument.
The dominant discourse on mediation style seems to come closest to the
"fashion" definition.
2 32
E. Labeling Differences as "Style" Obscures Mediator Bias
The failure of the label style to accurately differentiate among mediation
practices raises serious questions about standard assurances of mediator
neutrality.233 The guarantee of mediator neutrality234 is a pledge that the
mediator "makes no assessments, judgments, or value interventions., 235 This
assumption ignores the mediator's history,236 education, experiences, and
perspectives acquired over a lifetime-the lens through which each
individual perceives reality. 237  In Sara Cobb's poststructuralist analysis of
229. See Kressel et al., supra note 118, stating that "[m]ediator style refers to a cohesive set of
strategies that characterize the conduct of a case."
230. See Department of Dispute Resolution Services, supra note 77.
231. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1372 (4th ed. 2002).
232. See Della Noce, supra note 210, at 4, stating that "[a] notion has taken hold that...
mediator practices are no more consequential than a whim, and as easily donned, shed, changed, and
mixed and matched as the day's clothing."
233. See Cobb, supra note 79, at 98, stating that "[a]s others have noted, once the neutrality of
the mediator is called into question, so is the legitimacy of mediation practice as a whole."
234. See Scimecca, supra note 91, at 218, stating that "[t]he supposed neutrality of the third
party favors compromise and conceals the fact that values which confirm the existing advantages
between unequals are necessarily biased (Laue, 1982)."
235. WINSLADE & MONK, supra note 4, at 35.
236. See John A. Powell, The Multiple Self: Exploring Between and Beyond Modernity and
Postmodernity, 81 MINN. L. REv. 1481, 1490 (1997),.stating that:
Hegel was the first philosopher of the modem period to suggest that reason and identity
are not transcendental, but instead need to be viewed in a historical context ... Because
reason was not only the essence of man, but also the primary tool that enabled man to
understand and order the experiential world, the conclusion that reason is relative
inherently undermines modem conceptions of the world as objectively ordered and
knowable ....
237. See Moreno, supra note 190, at 2, stating that:
Mediators have to recognize that they have biases. We all have biases. We have all had
negative experiences... e.g., that I lost my job because I had a male supervisor who did
not like me. From then on the memory of the disaster is colored by the experience, the
perception, and the bias against male supervisors.
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objectivity she argues that: "[O]bjectivism is fundamentally a Newtonian
concept-reflective of a universe in which it is possible to stand outside
(narrative) time and (social) space, separate and autonomous from
interpretive frames, relational patterns, and communicative
processes ... ""
Each of us is always hearing and seeing from a perspective,239 a point of
view: mediators are not blank slates.2 40  These perspectives are formed by
life experiences in families and cultures, and by governments and
educational institutions.2 4' The use of language and the interpretation of
what others say is part of that perspective.242 Believing in the ideology of
neutrality243 and the individual ability to be objective244 or neutral, most
mediators do not question it. 245  While research has shown that it is
impossible to be aware of biases since they operate unconsciously,2 46 it is
238. Cobb, supra note 79, at 89.
239. See Catherine Pierce Wells, Improving One's Situation: Some Pragmatic Reflections on
the Art of Judging, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 323, 336 (1992), noting "[a]s human beings, our
individual perspectives are such intimate and constant companions that we forget that they are there.
Thus, we need constant reminders that we each have our own distinctive window on the world."
240. See Mary Thompson, Teaching Ethical Competence Activities for Training Mediators,
DisP. RESOL. MAG., Winter 2004, at 23, stating that "[e]thical behavior involves far more than
knowing a code of ethics. It involves understanding the personal factors that play a part in a
mediator's ethical decision making, e.g., morals, biases, religious and cultural values. These factors
impact the mediator's ... choice when ethical tenets come into conflict."
241. See Pinzan, supra note 48, at 9, stating that "[t]he mediator, torn between his or her goals,
interests, background, or some hidden agenda, may even have a decisive influence over what is
considered relevant to the mediation process (Gibson, Thompson, and Bazerman, 1993, discuss how
mediators also suffer from involuntary cognitive biases that affect them in dispute resolution)."
242. See Wells, supra note 239, at 323, quoting Justice Cardozo regarding the objectivity of
judges:
All their lives, forces which they do not recognize and cannot name, have been tugging at
them-inherited instincts, traditional beliefs, acquired convictions; ... In this mental
background every problem finds its setting. We may try to see things as objectively as
we please. None the less, we can never see them with any eyes except our own.
243. See Cobb, supra note 79, at 89, stating that "[p]roblematically, informal processes have
appropriated the concept and the discourse of neutrality with none of the formal procedural rules or
codes for practicing neutrality."
244. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward
Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS J. OF WOMEN IN CULTURE & Soc'y 637, 644-45 (1983), stating
that "[o]bjectivity is liberal legalism's conception of itself. It legitimizes itself by reflecting its view
of existing society, a society it made and makes so by seeing it, and calling that view, and that
relation, practical rationality."
245. See Scimecca, supra note 91, at 218, stating that "[v]ery few, if any, practitioners of ADR
challenge the neutrality position; for them it is an unexamined assumption. As such, their neutrality
supports the status quo, no matter how unequal it may be."
246. See Moreno, supra note 190, at 1, noting:
Psychologists who study the effect of bias on decision-making indicated that we are
always wrong if we think that we can be impartial and exhibit no bias ... even when we
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now widely understood that, in the words of Justice Cardozo, "we can never
see ... with any eyes except our own. '247 Meaning making is thus a highly
subjective activity. 4 8 Without an awareness of the way bias informs
perception, objectivity-the ideology behind the act of neutrality-functions
as a dangerous illusion. The illusion of objectivity grants rationality 249 and
power to those who define it, and oppresses those subject to its
definitions.2 50  Mediation thus reinforces power imbalances25' that exist
between parties outside mediation through the perspectives of mediators,2 52
many of whom come from privileged and educated backgrounds.2153 From
the point of view of their own privilege,254 mediators are therefore likely to
be aligned with the more powerful 255 in an environment that silences the less
think we are compensating for our bias, it is not something we can easily remove or
factor out of our decisions because it operates unconsciously.
247. Wells, supra note 239.
248. See POLKINGHORNE, supra note 6, at 7, stating that "[elach of us has direct access to only
one realm of meaning: our own. Because it is not available to direct public observation, the region
of meaning must be approached through self-reflective recall or introspection in our mental realm."
249. See MacKinnon, supra note 244, at 645, stating that "[i]f rationality is measured by point-
of-viewlessness, what counts as reason will be that which corresponds to the way things are.
Practical will mean that which can be done without changing anything."
250. See EDELMAN, supra note 8, at 136, stating that "the conspicuous labeling and segregation
of some as 'deviants' constitutes a potent, though masked and subtle reinforcement of convenional
thought and behavior. Those who are so labeled serve as a benchmark for everyone, marking off
normality from unacceptability."
251. See id. at 212, stating that "[w]here bargaining resources are equal, participation produces
real influence on who gets what. When they are strikingly unequal, as is almost always the case,
participation becomes a symbol of influence that encourages quiescence, rather than substantive
gains, for the powerless."
252. See id. at 152, noting that "[i]n this century, the 'helping professions' have reinforced
inequality by equating adjustment to existing social, economic, and political institutions with
psychological health."
253. See Harrington & Merry, supra note 20, at 724, stating that "core mediators, people who
mediate most often ... tend to be more educated than the total mediator pool and are more likely to
have professional backgrounds in law or the helping professions."
254. See Trina Grillo, Antiessentialism and Intersectionality: Tools to Dismantle the Master's
House, 10 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L. J., 16, 30 (1995). Grillo makes the point that our perspectives
and experiences are often a result of our privilege, in essence, obliviousness is privilege, stating that
"[olne of our privileges is to not notice that we are heterosexual, to assume that laws, customs, and
habits should be, while non--discriminatory, based on the norm of our heterosexual lives." Id.
255. See Scimecca, supra note 91, at 218, stating that "from the perspective of Weberian
conflict theory, the role of power must be assessed, before the parties can begin to deal with
misunderstanding and any lack of communication."
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powerful. 5 6 Despite assertions that mediation is voluntary, the expectation
of participation in mediation 257 can become coercive when based on the
concept of acceptance of responsibility, 258 especially in court referred cases.
Mediators inherently advocate for both participation and resolution.25 9 Thus
the iterations that the actions of mediators come from a "value-free,
culturally neutral perspective, can no longer be justified. 2 60
F. Defining Neutrality of the Mediator as Detachment is Not the Same as
the Role of Peacemaker in Traditional Non-Legal Processes
The promise of neutrality in mediation, particularly in its role of serving
the court, is a departure from the traditional roots of non-legal practices. In
their article on the Navajo Justice and Harmony Ceremony, 6 1 Philmer
Bluehouse and James W. Zion articulate the concept of the integration of
justice and community.262 Non-legal practices 261 that exist in many
indigenous cultures 26 differ from the Western judicial tradition in the
relationship to power and authority. Navajo culture rests on a sense of
harmony among all living things. Coercion is alien to Navajo relationships
256. See Cobb, supra note 90, at 399, stating that "silence inevitably supports the existing
regime, legitimates those who silence victims, and undermines the rule of law itself."
257. See EDELMAN, supra note 8, at 126, stating that:
Because participation symbolizes democracy, it systematically clouds recognition of
conflicting interests that persist regardless of negotiation. The adoption of formal
procedures for direct or indirect participation in decisions conveys the message that
differences stem from misunderstandings that can be clarified through discussion or that
they deal with preferences that are already compromised ... such routines perpetuate and
legitimize existing inequalities in influence, in the application of law, and in the
allocation of values.
258. See Harrington & Merry, supra note 20, at 720, stating that "[v]oluntary participation in
mediation is viewed as enhancing the development of an individual's capacity to take responsibility
for his or her problems and work out consensual agreements with others."
259. See Cobb, supra note 90, at 414, stating that "the morality of mediation itself frames the
interpretation of action-'right' and 'wrong' are subsumed by the ideals of 'participation' or
'conflict resolution."'
260. CONLEY & O'BARR, supra note 3, at 40.
261. See Bluehouse & Zion, supra note 28.
262. See id. at 329, stating that "Navajos know their clan relatives and interact with them,
prompted by strong values which create Navajo solidarity. Those values are virtues which become
an engrained emotional cement to bond the individual to the clan and the clan to the individual."
263. See id. at 335, stating that "[t]he English words mediation and arbitration do not
accurately reflect how Navajos feel about theirjustice ceremony."
264. See id. at 330, stating that "[m]ost tribes did not have strong leaders with absolute or
hierarchical power, as was typical of European vertical systems of authority. Most tribal leaders
were persuasive and not coercive."
36
Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 9, Iss. 1 [2008], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol9/iss1/1
[Vol. 9: 1, 2008]
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL
and, in itself, may be seen as evil.165 In contrast, when applying mediation
techniques in the context of the American legal system, or in supposed
"communities" that lack the real bonds of traditional communities,266 the
focus shifts from restoring harmony to the social fabric2 67 to dealing with
isolated acts. 68 In Navajo culture, the peacemaker's role is to reaffirm the
social values which both parties and peacemakers hold dear.269 In U.S.
culture, the role of the neutral has been equated with detachment.27 °
Production of community mediation in U.S. culture was initiated from
the top down, from the courts and the legal hierarchy, 27' as opposed to the
integral use of non-legal processes in traditional cultures.2 72  As a result of
the endorsement of the courts, mediation emerged from three distinct sectors
of the community: "[11 the delivery of dispute resolution services, [2] social
transformation, and [3] personal growth.2 73  Though each context has a
265. See id. at 332, stating that "[c]oercion (forcing someone else to do one's will) is alien to
Navajo thought about human relationships. It is contrary to Navajo morals and can be an evil in
itself."
266. See id. at 331-32, noting "[r]eality is not segmented or compartmentalized in the Navajo
world view. There is no separation of religious and secular life. Everything has its place in reality
and in a relationship to the whole which is something like the clan relationship."
267. See Nader, supra note 10, at 624, quoting Auerbach in pointing out the difficulty in
importing communal ideologies into American legal structures:
There is every reason why the values that historically are associated with informal justice
should remain compelling: especially the preference for trust, harmony and reciprocity
within a communal setting. These are not, however, the values that American society
encourages or sustains; in their absence there is no effective alternative to legal
institutions.
268. See Bluehouse & Zion, supra note 28, at 334, stating that "a peacemaker helps the parties
identify how they have come to the state of disharmony. Non-Indian dispute resolution tends to
focus more on the act which caused the dispute."
269. See id. at 234, noting:
Peacemakers have strong personal values, which are the product of their language and
rearing in the Navajo way. These values are also the teachings of Navajo common
law ... Navajo peacemakers, unlike their American mediator counterparts, have an
affirmative and interventionist role to teach parties how they have fallen out of harmony
by distance from Navajo values.
270. See Harrington & Merry, supra note 20.
271. See Delgado et al., supra note 61, at 1366, noting "[tihe current ADR movement enjoys
broad support; its proponents include Chief Justice Burger, the American Bar Association, legal
educators, legal journals, corporate counsel, federal and state legislators, and the media."
272. See AUERBACH, supra note 9, at 140, stating that "[a] striking feature of indigenous
community dispute settlement, not only in the American experience but in the various cultures that
still nourish it, is the virtually total absence of access to justice as a problematic issue."
273. Harrington & Merry, supra note 20, at 710.
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different agenda, all three reference the neutrality of the mediation
process,274 and thereby of the mediators themselves, as a way to resolve the
contradictions between consensual275  and community... justice. The
ideology of objectivity and the practice of neutrality as detachment are used
to justify the benefits of mediation and to give mediation organizations that
fulfill these criteria, access to material resources. 277 Neutrality, defined as a
"detached stance, 278 is a vastly different criterion than found in traditional
non-legal processes.
279
G. "Style " Disappears When Promising "Neutrality" Thereby Obscuring
Power Imbalances
Naming differences in mediator practices as styles, functions as a cover-
up for bias2t 0 when viewed in the context of the unquestioned assumption of
neutrality of both the mediation process and its practitioners. What is style,
but the individual mediator's experience, education, and perspective? 281 If,
on one hand, mediators continue to pledge neutrality, and on the other, to
explain away differences in mediator practices as style, the power
imbalances between the parties, of the parties in relation to the mediator, and
of the court and state over the parties,2 2 remain invisible. The obfuscation
274. See id. at 723, stating that "all three programs address the ambiguities between the
symbolic demands of community justice and consensual justice by focusing on the neutrality of the
process."
275. See id. at 717, stating that "[c]onsensual justice refers to justice produced through a
voluntary process."
276. See id. stating that "[c]ommunity justice associates mediation with democratic values,
such as community participation and neighborhood self-govemance, and it evokes the sense of a
cohesive community..."
277. See id.
278. See id. at 730.
279. See Bluehouse & Zion, supra note 28, at 334, stating that "[a] peacemaker, as a naat'aanii,
is selected because of personal knowledge of Navajo values and morals and the demonstrated
practice of them."
280. See Christopher Honeyman, Patterns of Bias in Mediation, 1985 J. DISP. RESOL., 141,
141, stating that "[like all other dispute resolution processes, mediation has inherent tendencies to
benefit certain people and to harm others. For want of a less inflammatory word, these tendencies
must be called biases."
281. See Powell, supra note 236, at 1484, stating that "far from being a unitary and static
phenomenon untainted by experience, one's core identity is made up of the various discourses and
structures that shape society and one's experience within it."
282. See HOFRICHTER, supra note 14, at 153, stating that:
The revitalization of neighborhood dispute resolution forums is a phase in an ongoing
restructuring and expansion of the capitalist state. A central feature in the structuring
concerns the continued blurring between the state and civil society such that the state
does not appear to be the state but rather part of the landscape of community social life.
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of power is accomplished by attribution of differences in mediator practices
to style, thereby avoiding accountability of the mediator's responsibility to
balance power.283  Thus, questioning the use of the word style to describe
mediator differences is analogous to Cobb's deconstruction of neutrality:
"[N]eutrality 'disappears' itself in order to remain unavailable for critique
and, like a loyal servant, reappears to fend off critiques that may dislodge the
institutions that derive their power from this concept.
28 4
Style 'disappears' when we promise neutrality, and appears when
explaining different choices mediators make about content and process.
2 85
Style, as a descriptor, does not indicate what a mediator will or will not do,
and offers no discemable reference point for parties to make an informed
choice.2 86  While well-intentioned mediators 287 may attempt to fulfill the
requirements of transparency by informing parties of their style,288 the
primary benefit of the label "style" is to maintain the appearance of offering
a predictable process with negligible variations. Predictability in mediation
benefits the court by assuring parties of uniformity in substance and quality
of mediation. In support of the court's agenda, some mediators claim that it
is too confusing, self-indulgent, and burdensome to share differences in
mediation practices with parties.2 89 Others suggest that in serving the
283. See Scimecca, supra note 91, at 217, stating that "ADR, if it is to be more than another
mechanism of social control, must take the unequal distribution of power into consideration and try
to resolve the dispute without assuming that the parties are equal and thereby, by default, coming out
on the side of the more powerful."
284. See Cobb, supra note 79, at 15.
285. See BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 22, at 71, stating that "it is somewhat surprising that
mediator influence or directiveness is not commonly viewed as problematic ... it is partly because
mediator influence is not obvious; in fact, it is easily masked."
286. See Nolan-Haley, supra note 215, at 778-79, stating that "the state of informed consent in
mediation today is often more illusory than real. Parties, particularly those without lawyers, often
enter mediation without a real understanding of the process and leave mediation without a real
understanding of the result."
287. See EDELMAN, supra note 8, at 151, stating that "[t]he overwhelming majority want to
believe that their own roles are meaningful contributions to the greater good, and so have good
reason to accept the reassuring perspective on public affairs, rather than one that upsets both their
belief in institutions they have supported and their belief in themselves ......
288. Jeffrey Krivis & Barbara McAddo, A Style Index for Mediators, MEDIATE.COM, Dec.,
1997, http://www.mediate.com//articles/krivis4.cfm.
289. See Stemple, supra note 2, at 384, stating that "[e]ven the most sophisticated disputants
will be confused and possibly put off by a mediator's strict adherence to the facilitative mode
interrupted by bursts of self-conscious rhetoric about changing modes or a mediator's decision to
alter or end the process in which the parties have invested substantial effort."
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court's mandate, mediation undermines parties' self-determination.29 ° If
mediation and other ADR processes were indeed initiated to further the
court's agenda of informal justice, then it makes sense to ask: is mediation
succeeding in fulfilling the "mandate" to serve the court?
IV. IS MEDIATION FULFILLING ITS 'MANDATE' TO SERVE THE
COURT?
A. One Example of Court Oversight: The Supreme Court of Virginia
Since the mandate for introducing mediation in the courts came from an
attempt to address dissatisfaction with the court, it stands to reason that
mediation is seen to benefit the court. Mediation and ADR processes,
reinvigorated by the Pound conference, ultimately produced court-referred
mediation in many states, such as Virginia,2 91 based on the values and goals
of the justice system. 92 Using the example of the Supreme Court of
Virginia's oversight of mediation for the state courts offers a window into
the functioning of mediation through the court. In 1987 Virginia's Chief
Justice Harry L. Carrico began the process of introducing informal processes
into the Virginia courts by the appointment of a Commission on the Future
of Virginia's Judicial System. In 1988 a Mediation Statute was passed by
the General Assembly. 93  By 1989, the Futures Commission report
recommended ten "visions," including one to provide a range of dispute
resolution options so that parties might "select a process that best meets the
290. See Welsh, supra note 88, at 25, stating that "[p]erhaps inevitably, current evidence
strongly suggests that the 'legitimacy handed to [the ADR movement] by its assimilation into the
court system' has come at a price."
291. See Department of Dispute Resolution Services, Mediation Historical Background, VA.
JUDICIAL SYSTEM, http://www.courts.state.va.us/drs/general-info/history.html, which states:
The Futures Commission conceptualized the various dispute resolution options as lying
along a continuum, with those processes which are least formal and include the most
party control over the outcome at one end, and those processes which are the most formal
and include a third party decision-maker at the other end: conciliation, mediation, early
neutral evaluation, summary jury trial, arbitration, settlement conference, adjudication.
The use of the label ADR, Alternative Dispute Resolution, cites these processes as alternatives to the
law. Here it is established that these are options within the law, not alternatives to it. Id. The use of
the label alternatives is itself misleading.
292. See Della Noce, supra note 18, at 555, stating that "[tihe mediation process itself was
distorted in the service of the values and goals of the justice system."
293. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-581.21 to 8.01-581.26 (2008).
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needs of their case. 294  In 1991 the Department of Dispute Resolution
Services was established within the Office of the Executive Secretary. 95
The statistical data available from the Supreme Court of Virginia for the
fiscal year 2003-04, shows the total allotment for mediation is $1,204,410.296
This does not include the operating costs of the Office of Dispute Resolution
and the grants given for court coordinators in localities around the state,
which come from other sources. Nor does it include compensation for time
spent by the clerks in the localities who are assigning and processing the
cases referred to mediation. The allotment refers only to what is paid to
mediators. Cases in General District, Juvenile and Domestic Relations (J &
DR) and Circuit Courts, each receive different compensation. In General
District Court, cases are reimbursed at $90 per case, in J&DR Court $100
per case, and in Circuit Court, $200 per case. The data collected by the
Supreme Court indicates that most cases take an average of: 0-2.0 hours in
mediation sessions, 1.25 hours for case management (intake and orientation,
setting up sessions, data entry, etc.) and .75 hours for writing agreements,
averaging approximately 4.0 hours.297 The hourly compensation for General
District Court cases would then be $22.50 per hour, J&DR cases $25 per
hour and Circuit Court cases $50 per hour, although only the time spent in
mediation sessions is actually compensated.
B. Mediation Functions as a Volunteer Profession
Given these numbers, it is doubtful that most mediators are motivated
by economic gain. Although $20-$50 would be considered a decent hourly
wage by most standards, case referrals may be intermittent and
unpredictable, and as in Virginia, these allotments are spread out among
many mediators statewide. There is no income security or other employee
benefits for mediators. Thus, it is unlikely that many mediators will find this
a viable way to make a living. Most mediators volunteer through mediation
294. Department of Dispute Resolution Services, supra note 291.
295. Id.
296. Office of the Executive Secretary, Statistical Mediation Information: Mediation
Expenditures by Fiscal Year, SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA, available at
http://www.courts.state.va.us/drs/general-info/statistical.pdf. The chart indicates that $1,204,410
was spent on mediation. Id. Mediations in the state totaled 2431 for General District Court, 5272
for Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court and 150 for Circuit Court. Id. Additional charts list
hours spent in three categories: hours of mediation, case management and agreement writing. Id.
297. Id. at 12-14.
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centers that receive the bulk of the monies paid for mediation298 to defray
their operating expenses. Many mediators "keep their day jobs" and work
around busy schedules to offer what they believe to be a service that benefits
their communities. While not quite "charity work," the low fees create a
public expectation that mediation should be free or low-cost 29 9 even when
offered privately, in essence, derailing professionalism. Though appearing
to advocate for mediation, the current climate established by the court keeps
the pool of certified mediation practitioners operating as "on call" volunteers
for minimal compensation. Thus the system provides mediators the inner
satisfaction of offering an option to parties that is said to be, "tremendously
successful, 300 but does not offer adequate financial compensation.
C. Comparison of the Total Number of Cases in General District, Juvenile
and Domestic Relations and Circuit Courts with Number of Cases
Mediated, Indicates Mediation is Having a Minimal Impact
Based on the case and budget numbers, mediation is not having much
impact on alleviating court dockets or saving the courts money. In Virginia
in 2004, General District Court had 3,215,144 new cases,30 1 of which 2431
were mediated,30 2 (.0008 per cent). The Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Courts had 511,078 new cases 3 3 of which 5272 were mediated, 30 4 (.01
percent) and of the 105,197 new civil cases in Circuit Court,30 5 150 were
mediated through court referrals (.001 per cent).30 6 Thus, the numbers of
mediated cases is quite small in comparison to the total number of cases in
298. See id.
299. See Brazil, supra note 44, at 141, stating that "[s]ome courts and parties will want neutrals
to work at economy rates, or pro bono, while organizations of neutrals are likely to press for
payment at professionals' market rates (agreeing to perform only limited work for free as a public
service)."
300. Office of the Executive Secretary, DRS Explores Quality Assurance Initiatives,
RESOLUTIONS: A QUARTERLY UPDATE ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION, Dec. 2005, at 1, available at
http://www.courts.state.va.us/drs/resolutions/2005/december- 2005-resolutions.pdf, stating that
"[p]arty satisfaction with the mediation process is well over 90% and the agreement rate is, on
average, 80-85%... [indicating that] family mediation has been tremendously successful ...."
301. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, CASELOAD STATISTICS OF THE DISTRICT COURTS (2005),
http://www.courts.state.va.us/csi/dbrl_2004.pdf.
302. See Office of the Executive Secretary, DRS Explores Quality Assurance Initiatives, supra
note 300.
303. See COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, supra note 301.
304. See Office of the Executive Secretary, DRS Explores Quality Assurance Initiatives, supra
note 300.
305. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, CIRCUIT COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS: CIVIL (2006),
http://www.courts.state.va.us/csi/age o fconcluded-civil_cases_2006.pdf.
306. See Office of the Executive Secretary, Statistical Mediation Information, supra note 296.
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each court. The annual budgets of these courts in 2004 were $73,056,390
for General District Courts, 30 7 $54,467,738 for J&DR Courts30 and
$81,372,587 for Circuit Courts, 30 9 amounts that are quite substantial when
compared to the total mediation budget for all courts, of $1,204,410. Given
the numbers of cases mediated compared to the case volume in the courts,
one might wonder, is mediation mostly window-dressing? If mediation has
not lived up to its "promise" in relation to the courts, how does this failure
present obstacles to changing the dominant discourse on mediation?
V. WHAT ARE THE OBSTACLES TO CHANGING THE DOMINANT
DISCOURSE ON MEDIATION?
A. Identifying Five Major Obstacles to Changing the Discourse on
Mediation
This article has described three obstacles that prevent change in the
dominant discourse on mediation: (1) the effective use of mediation and
ADR to deflect criticism away from the court, supporting the court's
contention to have reformed itself; (2) the presentation of mediation as a
generic process (despite much evidence to the contrary), where differences
are due to the artistry of the practitioner, and where cooperation and
compromise replace rights and justice; and (3) use of the word and concept
of mediator style to address differences in how mediation is practiced, while
it actually functions as a cover up for mediator bias. Here we will address
two additional obstacles: (4) the confusion caused by promotion of
mediation as delivering "informal" justice while obscuring its relationship to
the law; and (5) the de-professionalizing of mediation through dependence
on volunteers, at the same time promising quality of service.




309. See COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, supra note 301.
43
Oberman: <em>Style</em> vs. <em>Model</em>: Why Quibble?
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2008
B. Promotion of Mediation as Delivering "Informal" Justice Obscures its
Relationship to the Law
1. Mediation is an option within the legal system and functions as a
mechanism of informalism
Despite the relatively small percentage of court cases using mediation,
as we have seen in the case of The Commonwealth of Virginia, the discourse
on mediation has been quite successful in presenting itself as a vital and
user-friendly31 ° "alternative" to a slow, cumbersome, and financially
exhausting legal system.3" Framing the discourse on mediation as an
"alternative" to the legal system perpetuates a mythology about mediation as
separate from the law.3 12  Mediation is one element in a repeatedly used
strategy to reform the courts through informal legal mechanisms.313
Mediation serves the purposes of legal informalism by addressing issues as
if they exist only between individuals,1 4 rather than as members of
groups.31 5  First, defining conflict as existing between individuals,
informalism then looks for solutions that focus only on the specific
individuals involved.3 16 Mediation, as an integral part of the court's agenda
310. See CONLEY & O'BARR, supra note 3, at 39-40, stating that "[c]ritics charge that the very
user-friendly qualities that have made mediation so popular also make it dangerous .. "
311. See Department of Dispute Resolution Services, supra note, 291 at 4, stating that "[t]he
public's perception of resolving a dispute through traditional adjudication is that the time and
expense involved is overwhelming. Disputants have become frustrated with long court delays and
discovery processes, the complexity of the law, and the unproductive use of their resources."
312. See AUERBACH, supra note 9, at 98-99, stating that "[b]ecause alternatives to litigation
revived within a highly developed legal culture, conciliation-and arbitration-had to be reconciled
with legal norms and values, and rendered acceptable to the legal profession."
313. See Abel, supra note 17, at 7, stating that "[i]nformal institutions are said to be a necessary
response to inexorable economic forces. The courts are 'overcrowded,' there is 'too much'
litigation, crime rates are rising, the prisons are full."
314. Silbey, supra note 66.
315. See Fineman, supra note 16, addressing how mothers as a group disappear in mediation
which deals only with individuals: "The focus of my inquiry is not the power of individuals within
any particular mediation context; rather, it is the lack of power that leaves custodial mothers as a
group disadvantaged in a political process ...."
316. See Abel, supra note 17, at 7, stating that:
It is just because individuation is the primary function of informal institutions that they
can accomplish their purpose using staff who possess little or no training, operate with
minimal supervision, and are bound by few rules... The goal is not regimentation but
disaggregation. Informal institutions produce this result by treating all conflict as
individually caused and amenable to individual solution.
See also Linda L. Putnam, Challenging the Assumptions of Traditional Approaches to Negotiation,
10 NEG. J. 337, 341 n.4 (1994), stating that:
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to offer informal justice, both enhances and obscures its connection to the
legal system. The notion of providing "informal justice" through ADR
processes that serve the court, impacts the mediators, the public
(community), and the parties.
Preserving the social order is the basic agenda of the court system.
317
Late nineteenth century Small Claims, Juvenile, and Conciliation 318 courts
sought to "Americanize the immigrant, rehabilitate the delinquent, the
deviant, and the discontent,"'3 19 thus establishing social control.32 ° Whether
the reason stated for current court support of informalization is crowded
31322 rduto 323dockets,32 1  over-litigiousness of the culture, cost reduction, or
Individual agency is a value that is esteemed in Western culture. It stems from a belief
that society is made of distinct and radically separate human beings who act
independently and are accountable for their own choices (Folger and Baruch Bush, 1994).
It differs from a communitarian society in which an individual's identity is connected to
and intertwined with other people (Putnam and Kolb in press).
See also Bluehouse & Zion, supra note 28, at 329, which states that "[t]he core of the common law
of most Native peoples is the 'segmentary lineage system,' which is a method of tracing
relationships and adjusting disputes among people who are related to each other in various ways."
317. See HOFRICHTER, supra note 14, at 29, stating that:
Increasingly, formal state apparatuses have also had to accept more tasks as private
institutions such as church and family have become inadequate to handle private and
public disorder ... although police handle these activities and other moments of conflict,
they cannot resolve, regulate or prevent them or, in other ways, manage the social
environment in accordance with the requirements for order in a capitalist society.
318. See Nader, supra note 10, at 630, noting "[c]onciliation, however, did not develop from
within the communities it was intended to serve. Rather, it was established for low-income
communities by the legal establishment itself in order to remove trivial claims from the judicial
system."
319. See HOFRICHTER, supra note 14, at 20.
320. See HARRINGTON, supra note 12, at 53, stating that "[t]he domestic relations, small
claims, and conciliation courts were called 'socialized courts' in the sense that their 'procedures and
remedies focused on diagnosis, prevention, cure, education' . . . Progressives claimed that the
specialized tribunals provided 'social justice' in contrast to 'legal justice."'
321. See Della Noce, supra note 18, at 546, stating that "[d]espite the clear recognition of the
unique social value of mediation in various dimensions of human interaction, this argument cast the
potential value of the mediation process to the justice system primarily in terms of improved case
management efficiency."
322. James E. McGuire & Frank E.A. Sander, Some Questions About "The Vanishing
Trial",DsP. RESOL. MAG., Winter 2004, at 17, noting "[a] new study shows a sharp decline in the
number of federal trials between 1962-2002-from 11 percent to 1.8 percent in civil cases, and from
15 percent to less than 5 percent in criminal cases."; see also William F. Felstiner, Richard L. Abel
& Austin Sarat, The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming...,
15 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 631, 631, 651 (1980-81) stating that "transformation studies render
problematic one of the most fundamental political judgments about disputing-that there is too
much of it, that Americans are an over-contentious people, far too ready to litigate (e.g., Rosenberg,
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preserving relationships,32 4 the underlying agenda continues to be to manage
and control conflict, or to eliminate it altogether. 325  The court's agenda of
social control is reinforced by the individual mediator's choice to perpetuate
it. 326 Mediators, for the most part do not think of themselves as agents of the
courts or the state despite the fact that they may be certified and paid by the
court, and are aligned with the (often hidden) agenda of the court.327
2. Informalism is portrayed as what the community wants and claims
to empower individuals and communities
Legal "informalism" it is said, appeals to the public as the answer to its
dissatisfaction with the courts.328 Indeed, informalism may suit the U.S.
cultural affinity for the "quick fiX., 3 2 9  If the assumption is made by the
public, the courts, and many mediators, that disputes are interpersonal rather
than collective, 3 0  then individuals refusing mediation are seen as
1972, Ehrlich, 1976, Kline, 1978). The transformation perspective suggests that there may be too
little conflict in our society."
323. See Abel, supra note 17, at 7.
324. See HARRINGTON, supra note 12, at 96, stating that "[t]he shift toward preserving the
ongoing relationships of consumers and families is a response to rights movements ... The power
imbalance between individuals and small businesses or corporations is a fundamental barrier to
equal justice in minor civil disputes."
325. See HOFRICHTER, supra note 14, at xxxiv-xxv, stating that "[l]iberal legal reformism,
aspires to solve the problem of social order through cooperation, administrative management of
political conflict, and impartial mediation between opposing classes. It views conflict as an evil to
be avoided, absorbed, or resolved-all within the prevailing order." "[M]ediation colonizes thought
about conflict, particularly the idea that there is too much conflict in society and mediation is the
solution." Id. at 157.
326. See Della Noce, Bush & Folger, supra note 45, at 57, stating that "it became apparent that
mediators not only have influence on the conflict interaction and outcome, but they also have
meaningful choices about the nature and extent of their influence. Further, those choices are
embedded in, reflect, and reproduce each mediator's fundamental social values and preferred moral
order."
327. See KOLB, supra note 37, at 172, stating that "whatever bias toward money or institutional
or professional interests exists in the system is mobilized through the actions of the mediators."
328. See Abel, supra note 17, at 8, stating that "[a] second line of argument in favor of
informalism is that the people want it. They are said to be dissatisfied with the courts and to prefer
institutions that are speedy, cheap, and more approachable."
329. See Honeyman, supra note 280. Honeyman describes three categories of bias: personal,
situational and structural. Honeyman calls "the tendency for the process to favor a quick or easy
way out instead of a real and enduring solution" a form of bias. Id. at 145.
330. Deborah M. Kolb & Jeffrey Z. Zubin, Mediation Through a Disciplinary Prism, in
HANDBOOK OF NEGOTIATION RESEARCH 244 (Max H. Bazerman, Roy J. Lewicki & Blair H.
Sheppard eds.), stating:
Many of the cases channeled into mediation are ones that are labeled 'interpersonal
disputes' ... Critics argue that when violence against women, neighborhood quarrels,
and landlord tenant disputes are channeled into mediation, these issues are reduced to
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uncooperative. By this reasoning, those choosing not to participate33' in
mediation (which is presented as voluntary), are often stigmatized as
adversarial.332 Many believe the "opportunity" to mediate should be
mandated by the court.3 33  Critics maintain that pressure to mediate, to
dissuade parties from using more adversarial processes,334  is an
abandonment of the hard-won political struggle to petition the courts for
redress when rights are at stake.335
The similarity in the reform movements of the late nineteenth and mid-
twentieth centuries 336 is the claim that informal processes would increase
community 337 involvement and keep conflicts in the community from
becoming social crises.338 Concerns about loss of individual rights in
individual problems that ignore and depoliticize their social and economic causes. By
individualizing these matters, there is less possibility for collective action or systemic
change.
331. See Pavlich, supra note 200, at 710, stating that "[i]n proponent's formulations mediation
emerges as a means of empowering individual disputants to free themselves of the state's
tutelage... It provides, they argue, an opportunity for individuals to reclaim control over conflict
resolution by choosing a settlement process that requires-rather than thwarts-their active
participation."
332. See Silbey, supra note 66, at 352, stating that "[t]he routine recourse to mediation creates a
bias against those who do not participate, with the result that they are often negatively characterized
and thus stigmatized as adversarial by those who rely on mediation to resolve a good share of the
dispute caseload."
333. See Harrington & Merry, supra note 20 at 721, stating that "[I]eaders in the service
delivery project have begun to rethink the role of voluntary participation in the mediation movement,
as a result of the low caseloads in mediation programs... The incentives that have been proposed
and established in a number ofjurisdictions make mediation mandatory for certain types of cases."
334. See Abel, supra note 17, at 8 stating that "[i]nformalism represents an attempt by the
dominant classes to impute wishes to the dominated so that the former can enjoy speedy,
inexpensive access to authoritative courts from which the latter have been excluded."
335. See HARRINGTON, supra note 12, at 173, stating that "[t]he alternatives movement seems
to have abandoned an important resource and arena for political struggle-rights and courts ... By
turning to diversion or an alternative justice system, we move away from rights as a politics resource
to the politics of consensus building outside or in the shadow of legal institutions."
336. See id. at 68-69, stating that "delegalization reform in both periods is an attempt to expand
the judicial capacity of courts and court-related institutions to manage minor disputes through the
use of informal procedures, mediation and arbitration."
337. See Wildman, supra note 104.
338. See HARRINGTON, supra note 12, at 31, stating that "[r]eformers maintain that a proactive
dispute process will redress the crisis with court capacity for two reasons: (1) it increases community
involvement in the management of everyday conflicts, and (2) it absorbs the mass of unresolved
conflicts before they turn into bigger problems."
47
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mediation,339 are compounded in critiques of the impact of mediation on the
community. 340  In their claims to serve the community34' by promoting
harmonious relationships,3 42 informal processes may in fact be preventing
communities from looking at ways to take collective action.3 43  By
addressing conflict as an individual problem and offering solutions for
individuals, the socio-political content of conflict is removed. 34
3. Diversion away from litigation, toward cooperation, without
reference to hard won legal rights, undermines those seeking justice
The conception of mediation as an alternative to the legal system, rather
than an option within it,345 thus creates an obstacle to a discourse about
mediation that would include the law as a resource for individuals and
oppressed groups seeking equality. 346  Presentation of informal legal
processes as preferable to formal ones undermines deeply held American
beliefs in the right to seek justice,347  a fundamental promise of
339. See Cobb, supra note 90, at 411-12, stating that "while rights construct the relation
between self and community, their reformulation into needs disintegrates that community, as actions
that were obligated within a normative frame are refrained as actions that please or appease an
individual."
340. See HOFRICHTER, supra note 14, at xiv, stating that "NDR falsely affirms the
neighborhood as the basis of justice in the community ... it presents an idea of community and
collective self-help that is contrived, uses community culture against itself as a form of regulation
and, by its presence, distracts attention from broader community issues."
341. See AUERBACH, supra note 9, at 134-35, stating that "[t]he new urban mediation
alternatives contradicted virtually every prerequisite for informal justice that comparative
anthropology and American history provided. Communities played no role in their design or
implementation."
342. See id. at 117-18, stating that "[a]fter 1968, when simmering rage exploded in urban
ghettos blighted by poverty and racism, the justification for alternatives quickly shifted. Informal
mediation was now promoted as 'an alternative to violence,' designed especially to coax civil rights
activists and their angry ghetto constituencies from the streets to quieter sanctuaries."
343. See Abel, supra note 17, at 9, noting "[i]nformal justice claims to be a 'community'
institution, but the residential community it serves is usually just the figment of some reformer's
imagination. Indeed, by individualizing conflict and facilitating exit from relationships, informal
institutions undermine community rather than create or preserve it."
344. See id., stating that:
To the extent that class issues can be reduced to interpersonal ones, conflicts will be
handled in some form. All other conflict must be managed by being translated into
technical issues devoid of political content and isolated from more profound struggles or
antagonisms that transcend the individual or limited group.
345. See Oberman, supra note 148, at 801.
346. See AUERBACH, supra note 9, at 145, stating that "[l]egal institutions may not provide
equal justice under law, but in a society ruled by law it is their responsibility."
347. See SCHEINGOLD, supra note 95, at 3, stating that "[t]he law is real, but it is also a figment
of our imaginations. Like all fundamental social institutions it casts a shadow of popular belief that
48
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democracy.3 48 When mediation operates as a diversion from seeking justice,
it perpetuates the acquiescence of those who have historically sublimated
their grievances.3 49 The shift away from legal principles and "bright line"
legal rules in mediation has meant that placing blame and finding fault is
seen as adversarial.35 ° In no-fault divorce cases, for example, the family is
viewed as a closed system in which all members are held responsible for
what happens within it.35'
Mediation thus buries 'right' and 'wrong' beneath the ideals of
'participation' and 'conflict resolution,'352 and personalizes disputes, so that
the actions of one party toward another become a shared psychological
problem. 353 When the discourse on "participation" and "conflict resolution"
silences the discourse on rights,354 the law disappears as the reference
point.355 As long as mediators perpetuate the court agenda behind informal
justice,3 56 there can be no "reflection" on how mediation impacts the
may ultimately be more significant, albeit more difficult to comprehend, than the authorities, rules,
and penalties that we ordinarily associate with law."
348. See id. at 37, stating that:
The myth of rights, in sum, encourages the view that the United States Constitution is a
beneficent document which is in large measure responsible for both our affluence and our
domestic tranquility. Our constitutional order is said to be responsive to reason rather
than power, to promote the public interest, and to nurture change within a reassuring
framework of continuity.
349. See id. at 132, stating that "[o]ne of the primary obstacles to social change is the
acquiescence of the oppressed."
350. Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J.
1548, 1560 (1991), stating that:
The informal law of the mediation setting requires that discussion of principles, blame,
and rights, as these terms are used in the adversarial context be deemphasized or avoided.
Mediators use informal sanctions to encourage parties to replace the rhetoric of fault,
principles, and values with the rhetoric of compromise and relationship.
351. Seeid.at1561.
352. See Cobb, supra note 90, at 430.
353. See id.
354. See id. at 414, stating that "[w]hen violence is domesticated, the morality of mediation
itself frames the interpretation of action-'right' and 'wrong' are subsumed by the ideals of
'participation' or conflict resolution. Conversely, when it is not domesticated, rights are maintained
in the discourse."
355. See id. at 399, stating that "[w]herever victims are disappeared, silence invariably supports
the existing regime, legitimates those who silence victims, and undermines the rule of law itself."
356. See HARRINGTON, supra note 12, at 12, stating that "[ijnformal procedures are idealized as
nonadversarial, rehabilitative, and preventative methods for resolving conflict."
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communities it purports to serve.357 Only if and when mediators and the
public recognize the role of informal processes as they actually exist among
a range of legal options, will the decision of the parties to choose ADR, truly
be based on self-determination.
C. Mediation is De-Professionalized Through Use of Volunteers, While at
the Same Time it Promises Quality of Service
The remaining obstacle to a comprehensive discourse on mediation is
the tension created between the promise to provide quality of service, and
the reality of overseeing a large volunteer mediator pool spread throughout a
state. Again using Virginia as an example, keeping track of certified
mediators and the cases being mediated, the mentorship process, and all
trainings statewide, is already a daunting task.358 New mediators are
mentored through the certification process 359 by experienced mediators,
primarily through community mediation centers. Though mentors may
charge for mentoring services, it is often done without compensation,
maintaining the number of certified mediators statewide, at approximately
1000. Once a mediator is certified, oversight comes primarily from
evaluations filled out by the parties. If a mediator gets a poor evaluation, the
Office of Dispute Resolution will contact the mediator to find out what her
357. See Tim Hedeen & Patrick Coy, Community Mediation and The Court System: The Ties
That Bind, 17 MEDIATION Q. 351, 355-56 (2000), stating that:
The current state of relations between community mediation and the justice system raises
a number of concerns regarding the integrity and viability of mediation. With the high
proportion of community mediation programs' caseloads and funding coming from the
court system, many programs may find themselves in tenuous, if not compromising
positions.
Hedeen and Coy name six areas of concern, the last of which (but not least) is "the loss of focus on
'community' in community mediation." Id. at 356.
358. See Office of the Executive Secretary, DRS Explores Quality Assurance Initiatives, supra
note 300, at 1, stating that "[i]n an effort to ensure the quality and competency of mediators that
provide services in court-referred matters, the Judicial Council adopted Guidelines for the Training
and Certification of Court Referred Mediators, Guidelines for the Certification of Mediation
Training Programs, Standards of Ethics, Grievance Procedures, and Client Evaluations."
359. See Office of the Executive Secretary, Membership Guidelines, supra note 72.
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perspective is-but concrete remedies short of revoking certification360 are
non-existent. 36
In 2003-05 the Virginia Association of Community Conflict Resolution
(VACCR) and the Virginia Mediation Network (VMN) initiated a Mediation
Peer Consultation program to address the court's concerns about quality
assurance in mediation.362 The program was to be run through mediation
centers, by volunteer facilitators, at no cost to (voluntarily) participating
mediators.3 63  The Mediation Peer Consultation program continued to use a
generic concept of mediation. 364  There was no attention given to how a
facilitator who uses one style would supervise a mediator who uses another.
In keeping with reflective mediation concepts, there was no reference to any
model. Rather, each mediator would learn to use the process for his own
inner awareness. 365 Thus, in joining with the court in the effort to provide
high quality mediation services, many respected scholars and mediation
360. See Caroll E. Dubuc, Credentialing for Mediators: Will One Size Fit All?, RESOLUTIONS:
A QUARTERLY UPDATE ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION, Jan. 2005, at 10, available at
http://www.courts.state.va.us/drs/resolutions/anuarv2005.pdf, asserting that "maintaining the quality
of mediators with an available sanction of de-certification by the same Supreme Court which admits
lawyers is a positive element."
361. See Waldman, The Challenge of Certiflication, supra note 24, at 724, stating that
"identification of the criteria by which qualified mediators may be distinguished from charlatans has
proven elusive."
362. See Dubuc, supra note 360, at 9, noting that "[t]he VMN had previously conducted a one-
day colloquium on quality and credentialing in 2002, and last year at its annual meeting it had an
extended session on credentialing with panelists who were in the administrative functions for
credentialing in three fairly sophisticated state programs in Florida, Texas and Georgia."
363. Mediator Peer Consultation Workshop, Charlottesville, Va. (June 30, 2005) (unpublished
PowerPoint presentation, on file with the author). The project was a joint venture of VACCR and
VMN with the goals of providing a "Low-cost sustainable mechanism for developing mediator
competency." Id. In the stages of mediator development, (based on Lang's model) they list in
ascending order: "Novice, Apprentice, Practitioner, Artist." Id.
364. See Della Noce, Bush & Folger, supra note 45, at 43, stating that "[t]he mythic world of
mediation is one in which one practitioner of the art is pretty much like another in regard to motives
and orientation to the role."
365. Judy Cohen, Reflective Practice: How Veterans Can Benefit from Rookie Training, 21
ALTERNATIVES, Mar. 2003, 43, available at http://www.mediate.com/articles/cohen5.cfin?nl=25,
stating that:
Reflective practitioners are attuned to their reactions and can articulate what is behind gut
feelings or intuition in order to carry out effective interventions. They can anticipate the
unexpected. The reflective mediator goes further by thinking carefully through a range of
process options while contemplating interventions to make in mediation. Reflective
practitioners have brought their practice to a deeper level.
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practitioners further the de-professionalizing 66 of mediation, continuing to
use words that define differences as style or artistry, or choosing to ignore
the issue altogether.
VI. CHANGING THE DISCOURSE
A. Changing the Discourse Would Further Transparency
Several major changes would need to occur in order to shift the current
discourse towards an accurate identification of differences in mediator
practices. The first is to raise awareness of mediators and the public
regarding the use of "informal" processes to deflect criticism from the court,
thus recognizing context and content of the court's agenda. The second is to
address the contradictions in administering and assuring quality of mediation
primarily delivered by volunteers.36 7 The third is to change both the
language and practice regarding mediator differences from styles to models
through revamping of training.3 68 Training that reflects the theoretical basis
of each model and the norms each references would produce greater
transparency which in turn, supports party self-determination. Transparency
about mediation models as well as information about the range of legal
options, would counter the prevailing notion that conflict itself is
undesirable,369 which has discouraged demands for justice.
366. See Silbey, supra note 66, at 349, noting that "[slocial scientists.., use the term
'profession' with self-conscious specificity to denote a formally associated, self-regulated
occupation with a technical, expert knowledge base that makes claims to serve public and ethical
goals."
367. See Harrington & Merry, supra note 20, at 719, stating that:
The legal profession and the government have provided resources for building programs
compatible with the service delivery project. These reformers speak about community
justice in terms of expanding 'access to justice' . . . through the establishment of
mediation programs that train lay citizens to be mediators and provide this service in their
communities ....
368. See Waldman, The Challenge of Certification, supra note 24, at 728, stating that "to rely
on prevailing levels of theoretical naivete to justify training that perpetuates this lack of
sophistication appears illogical and unwise."
369. See Sarat, supra note 73, at 700 which notes that "Goldberg, Green, and Sander seem to
see disputes as problematic in and of themselves, as socially undesirable events. They see disputing
as pathological, not as indicative of emergent political struggles for valued ends or as symptomatic
of deeper social problems requiring structural change."
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B. Lack of Attention to Theory Results in Creation of "Lay" Theories
Mediation is criticized for lacking a theoretical base.37 ° Some scholars
acknowledge that differences may be due to prior professional training 371 or
philosophies. 37 2  However, most mediation training gives little attention to
theory. 373 Emphasis in training is on developing skills or techniques 374 such
as: active listening, empathy, negotiation; or on using tools: guidelines,
caucuses, agreements to mediate; and leaming strategies: clarification of
issues, shifting awareness, reality testing. But there is rarely a discourse on
"the when and why," 375 on what causes conflict and therefore what would
resolve it. When there is no specific theory, human beings will develop their
own, as 'lay theorists' 376 in order to act. Michael Lang explains that theories
"act like lenses. They help us to filter experiences, interactions,
communications and behaviors and out of them to construct meaning.,
377
And how "[w]ithout theory, we are like a sailboat without a keel, blown
away by the wind
' 378
Lack of attention to theories of what causes and resolves conflict results
in defining mediation as a series of techniques or instruments.379 Without a
370. See Scimecca, supra note 91.
371. See Andrew 1. Schwebel, David W. Gately, Maureen A. Renner & Thomas W. Milbum,
Divorce Mediation: Four Models and Their Assumptions About Change in Parties' Positions, 11
MEDIATION Q. 211, 214 (1994), asserting that "at least four different divorce mediation models can
be identified (with many divorce mediation approaches falling under each): the legal model, the
labor management model, the therapeutic model, and the communication and information model."
372. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 124, at 223, stating that "[d]ifferences in philosophies
about purpose (achieving 'justice,' reducing the pain, promoting public participation and community
control) have concrete effects on techniques chosen."
373. See Lang, supra note 78, at 5.
374. See BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 22, at 45, stating that "there is a strong interest in
identifying and implementing techniques that can help individual mediators achieve settlements and
generate party satisfaction, which are seen as the main goals of the process."
375. See Della Noce, Bush & Folger, supra note 45, at 41-42, stating that "[w]ithout such
explanation, practitioners lack grounded guidance for their interventions, and the mediation process
is open to many criticisms."
376. See id., stating that "mediators, like all other social actors, are 'lay theorists'-people with
their own vocabularies, frames of meaning, interpretive schemes and resources, and explanations for
their social worlds and activities."
377. Lang, supra note 78, at 7.
378. Id. at 5.
379. See Della Noce, supra note 18, at 553-54, noting:
Even before the Pound Conference, there had been little attention paid to explaining
mediation as an independent and unique social process, built on a particular set of values,
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theoretical framework to reference, mediators create their own.38° These
"lay theories" are based on the mediator's experience and perspective.
381
While these borrowed or created theories attempt to make up for the lack of
theory specific to mediation, they are inadequate to provide accurate
information on the decisions mediators make and why they make them.382
Defining mediation as artistry or naming styles based on strategic decisions
(i.e. to evaluate or facilitate), avoids addressing the theories of conflict on
which the strategic and tactical decisions are based.38 3 If a mediator's theory
of what causes conflict underlies the choice of strategies and tactics to
resolve it,3 84 then an analysis that focuses on the theory of conflict and
names models based on these theories, would put to rest the mythology of
generic mediation and its attribution of differences to style or artistry.385
to achieve particular social goals through the grounded practices of third parties. After
the Pound Conference, the lack of a distinct and coherent theoretical basis for the
mediation process very likely contributed to the ease of instrumentalizing the process.
380. See Della Noce, Bush & Folger, supra note 45, at 42, asserting that:
As mediation practice has developed, largely in the absence of articulated, scholarly,
theoretical frameworks explaining mediation as a distinct social process, practicing
mediators have tended to construct and express their own 'lay' theoretical frameworks by
relying upon: (1) 'mythology,' (2) 'imported' theories, and (3) skills and techniques that
were presumed to be theory-free.
381. See id., stating that "[a]s mediators interact with the parties during the course of the
mediation process, they constantly draw upon their preferred theoretical frameworks-whatever the
source-to interpret the unfolding interactions and to make choices about when and how to intervene
based upon their interpretations."
382. See id. at 47, stating that:
[S]eparately or together, they [borrowed theories] provide an insecure foundation for
mediators. They fail to encourage a serious examination of the reality that mediator
practices can and do influence parties' conflict, the questions of what kinds of influence
are appropriate and why, the nature of differences in mediators' motives and orientations,
and how different underlying ideologies shape mediators' goals ....
383. See Cobb, supra note 79, at 3, asserting how:
[G]uidelines for mediation practice are murky and filled with vagaries and paradoxes:
mediators must manage the process (in discourse) but must not impact the substance of
the dispute. This distinction between content and process in communication is central to
the existing rhetoric and assumptions about ethical practice. Yet, from a poststructural
perspective, the content of the dispute is constructed through discourse processes, and in
turn, those processes are a function of the content of the dispute.
384. See Della Noce, Bush & Folger, supra note 45, at 41-42, stating that:
If 'theory' is understood as 'the when and why' of intervention, it is apparent that
mediators must have a theory underlying their practices, no matter how naive or
obscured.., even if not drawing upon articulated scholarly frameworks for mediation
practice, mediators can and do actively construct their own theoretical frameworks to
give meaning and order to their work.
385. See Waldman, The Challenge of Certification, supra note 24, at 728, stating that "[o]ne
might further object that the field is not sufficiently reflective about the models it employs and their
appropriate uses to require that neophyte mediators be trained in and tested on this knowledge."
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C. The Set of Norms Referenced Informs the Mediator's Choice of
Interventions
Waldman defines social norms as "those principles and standards that
have attained consensus status in society. '35 6  She defines legal norms as
"principles and standards encoded in the law." '387 Mediators trained in the
norm-generating models have, for the most part, been reluctant to introduce
information into mediation. However, critics argue that use of a process that
in many instances excludes attorneys and that views demands for legal rights
as adversarial, places the less powerful and less informed parties at a
disadvantage.388 The theory behind the norm-educating models holds that
parties' autonomy is enhanced by having all necessary information, thereby
making informed decisions. 389 In norm-educating models information about
protective norms 390 is offered during mediation so that no party would make
a decision in which they might forfeit entitlements, because they were
unaware of their existence.39' In norm-advocating models, legal and ethical
norms create the framework for negotiation. The mediator's role is to
safeguard or advocate for inclusion of social and/or legal norms and values
in the agreement.392 Although a discussion of how to determine which
model best serves the parties in any given situation is beyond the scope of
this article, it is important to reiterate that Waldman's categories, even the
norm-advocating model, do not include evaluation of the probable outcome
in court.
D. "Reality Testing" is an Example of Referencing Norms
"Reality testing," a term that is often cavalierly used, is in fact a
reference to social/political norms. "Reality testing" has generally been
talked about as one of the tools in a mediator's "bag of tricks." For example,
386. Waldman, Identifying Social Norms, supra note 24, at 708.
387. See id.
388. See id. at 725 n.86, stating that "Richard Delgado and colleagues ... concludle] that
informal dispute resolution is likely to disadvantage racial and ethnic minorities."
389. See Weckstein, supra note 159, at 503, stating that "[t]he key to self-determination is
informed consent. A disputant who is unaware of relevant facts or law that, if known, would
influence that party's decision cannot engage in meaningful self-determination."
390. See Waldman, Identifying Social Norms, supra note 24, at 738, stating that "'protective
norms' .. . serve to protect one (or both) of the parties from exploitation or abuse."
391. Id. at 739.
392. Id. at 745.
-A-
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by referencing the expense and unpredictability of court, many mediators
strive to keep parties in negotiation and urge them to reach settlement.
However, the strategy of reality testing is dangerously vague3 93 and without
Waldman's framework which makes the norms referenced explicit, it
functions as yet another loophole for bias. Using Waldman's categories, in
the norm-educating and norm-advocating models, mediators will reference
the law and other social norms, thus resolving some aspects of the issue of
bias by making certain biases transparent.394 Best practices for mediators-
even those who are attorneys-still would not sanction referencing what a
judge might decide. Parties would understand the model of mediation to
which they are consenting prior to signing the agreement to mediate, and
would therefore be granting permission for the form of reality testing the
mediator will use. The norm-generating mediation models would not
reference the law once the agreement to mediate is signed, since parties have
agreed that they wish to reference their own values and norms.
E. Waldman's Categories Offer a Basis for Training and Evaluation of
Mediators
Many mediation skills and standards are difficult to decipher and put
into practice, without clarity about the model used and the norms referenced.
Waldman, in discussing a bill voted down by the California legislature, lists
a series of skills mediation trainees are expected to demonstrate: "(1)
Explaining and administering the process. (2) Facilitating the flow of
communication. (3) Empowerment of the parties. (4) Active listening. (5)
Ethical behavior. (6) Organization of the issues. (7) Conflict analysis. (8)
Developing options with the parties. (9) Managing negotiation. (10)
Strategy planning. (11) Use of neutral language. 395  Implementation of
these skills varies significantly according to what model is used. As long as
the mediation profession continues to assume that the only true mediation is
the generic problem-solving model, or by default declares that all mediation
is eclectic, there is little chance to distinguish among models and therefore
no real self-determination of parties. Without the option of norm-educating
and norm-advocating models, mediation continues to reinforce the notion
that all disputes are interpersonal, obscuring reference to any social
393. See Waldman, The Challenge of Certification, supra note 24, at 751, stating that
"considerable unclarity surrounds the mediator's role as the agent of reality."
394. See Moreno, supra note 190, at 2, stating that "[m]ediators may argue that because they
are not the ultimate decision makers in a mediation, they do not need to be aware or even recognize
their biases. However, in not recognizing their own biases and acknowledging that they are
susceptible to biases, they are creating barriers to resolving conflict."
395. Waldman, The Challenge of Certification, supra note 24, at 752.
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norms. 396  Without identifying real differences in models, training of
mediators fails to address the wide range of processes available to
consumers, thereby allowing mediators' biases to continue to operate under
the radar screen.
F. End Mediator Confusion by Recognizing the Agenda of Social Control
Confusion about3 97 and resistance to identifying differences based on
the norms or values398 being referenced and the theories of conflict
resolution underlying the different models399 has proved to be substantial.
400
Such resistance prevents mediation from taking its place among the other
professions, 40 1 as it fails to address claims of critics who charge that court
"support," although providing free or low-cost mediation, carries a hidden
(or not so hidden) agenda of social control. 403  Social control 404 is apparent
396. See id. at 754.
397. See id. at 729, noting that "[u]nfortunately, each classification system utilizes different
terminology and charts the contrasts between mediation models along different axes. As a result,
these efforts at clarification enrich our vocabulary but create a backwash of confusion."
398. See THE AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY, supra note 231, at 948, defining
"norm" as "[a] standard, model, or pattern"; Id. at 1514, defining "value" as "[a] principle, standard
or quality considered worthwhile or desirable."
399. See Scimecca, supra note 91, at 212, stating that "[a]lthough there are many
comprehensive theories of conflict, theories of conflict resolution are few and far between."
400. See Della Noce, Bush & Folger, supra note 45, at 58, stating that "the clarification of
value-based theoretical distinctions in the field is fundamentally threatening because, ironically
enough, the field of mediation does not yet have the capacity to deal constructively with difference."
401. See Scimecca, supra note 91, at 211, stating that "those who practice ADR will not
become true professionals until ADR incorporates a theoretical base to undergird its practice."
402. See Abel, supra note 17, at 5, stating that "[i]nformal processes appear to be less
expensive than formal, since the costs of legal institutions are largely attributable to personnel and
informal institutions replace highly paid professional with low-paid or volunteer lay persons or
paraprofessionals."
403. Id. at 6, stating that:
Informal institutions allow state control to escape the walls of those highly visible centers
of coercion-court, prison, mental hospital, schools-and permeate society. In place of
mechanisms of confinement and exclusion (which, by definition, are spatially delimited)
they substitute processes of penetration and integration that are dispersed and all-
encompassing.
404. Social control can be subtle, but is often evident in the language used to define a problem.
Mediators, especially in serving the court, use language to establish the legitimacy of the process and
their individual authority. See EDELMAN, supra note 8, at 75, noting how "[t]he helping professions
are the most effective contemporary agents of social conformity and isolation. In playing this
political role they undergird the entire political structure, yet they are largely spared from self-
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in the promotion of mediation as a way to "manage" conflict. 4 5  Social
control operates in mediation by removing political content from a dispute,
making the conflict interpersonal and individual, thus disconnecting parties
40640from community. The message conveyed is that conflict itself is bad,40 7
and the remedies to preempt further disruptions 4°8 are compromise and
409
cooperation.
VII. CONCLUSION: A CHALLENGE TO DEFINE MODELS
A. Do Not Build a House Without a Blueprint
Asking what model will be used (thinking of a model as a blueprint, as if
for building a house) makes sense, if we wish to build the house we want.
We can build a house without a model or blueprint, but there would be no
way of knowing how it would turn out. A proposal to name mediation
models that explains how we think about what we do, cannot be dismissed
because it will be more difficult for the courts to provide oversight or too
incomprehensible for parties to grasp.410 Such arguments are ultimately
self-serving and circular, perpetuating the invisibility of the court and the
law and the hidden influences of the mediator's bias on the parties'
conflict. 41I Acknowledging mediator influence inherent in each model
criticism, from political criticism, and even from public observation, through special symbolic
language."
405. The terms "conflict management" and "conflict resolution" are often used interchangeably.
However, the meanings are entirely different. See THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY, supra
note 231, at 839, defining "manage" as "to direct or control the use of'; Id. at 1184, defining
"resolve" as "[t]o make a firm decision about" or "[t]o cause (a person) to reach a decision."
406. See HOFRICHTER, supra note 14, at xxv, noting that:
To the extent that class issues can be reduced to interpersonal ones, conflicts will be
handled in some form. All other conflict must be managed by being translated into
technical issues devoid of political content and isolated from more profound struggles or
antagonism that transcend the individual or limited group.
407. See Sarat, supra note 73.
408. See HOFRICHTER, supra note 325, at xxiv-xxv.
409. See Fineman, supra note 16, at 732, discussing how mediation rhetoric has redefined
conflict in divorce:
The dominant rhetoric no longer describes divorce as a process that terminates the
relationship between spouses, establishing one as the custodial parent with clear
responsibilities. Rather, divorce is now described as a process that, through mediation,
restructures and reformulates the spouses' relationship, conferring equal or shared
parental rights on both parents although one, in practice, usually assumes the primary
responsibility ....
410. See Stemple, supra note 289, at 384.
411. See Della Noce, Bush & Folger, supra note 45, at 57.
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supports empowerment of parties as opposed to the use of the words style or
artistry, which fail to give accurate information about what the mediator will
or will not do. Information about the model and other ADR processes would
reduce the potential for coercion in mediation to make confessions412 and
concessions.413
B. Research Findings Link Mediator Influence to Social Norms
On the surface the efforts to humanize the courts414 and to make
informal legal remedies accessible to the citizenry, appear to be benign.
However, many argue that what is getting lost in pursuit of settlements is the
exercise of hard won legal rights.41 5 Others claim that mediation does not
challenge the traditional view of law, but by claiming to deliver neutrality,
actually maintains the "objectivist" paradigm.416 Presentation of mediation
as a generic process in which differences are attributed to the personal style
or artistry of the mediator, may serve the court in maintaining an ongoing
pool of mediators who are seen as interchangeable with one another.
However, continuing to present mediation as a generic process, using the
terms artistry and style to connote differences, does not acknowledge the
412. See Pavlich, supra note 200, at 723, stating that "the mediators try to extract and fashion
particular sorts of confessions by constantly probing for information, rephrasing issues, praising or
castigating confessors-all of which are directed at dispute settlement."
413. See CONLEY & O'BARR, supra note 3, at 40, stating that "in the cooperative ambiance of
the mediation session, people with strong legal and moral claims may be induced to let down their
guard and make concessions that are neither required by law nor consistent with their interests."
414. See Harrington, supra note 201, at 51, stating that "[s]ocial workers and psychologists
provided new resources for handling juveniles and linked courts to social agencies. The state,
represented by probation and parole officers, was cast in the role of 'friend,' helping poor and
working-class immigrant children to become socialized or 'Americanized.' Both developments
rendered the courts more interventionist."
415. See HARRINGTON, supra note 12, at 78, stating that "[c]onsumer and public interest groups
shared this concern: access to equal justice may conflict with the other two goals of promoting
harmony and maintaining public order"; See also HOFRICHTER, supra note 14, at xv, noting:
Ironically, it [NDR: Neighborhood Dispute Resolution] arose at a time of growing rights
consciousness in the late 1960's and early 1970's-women's rights, environmental rights,
children's rights, and, in general, person over property rights. This latest emergence of
NDR comes amid new social movements that cannot be contained by the formal legal
system.
416. See Janet Rifkcin, Mediation From a Feminist Perspective: Promise and Problems, 2 LAW
& INEQ. 21, 23 (1984), stating that "what is not yet known is whether in practice, mediating disputes
reflects feminist jurisprudential differences from the male ideology of law or whether mediating
simply reinforces the 'objective epistomology' of law."
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research findings and scholarship that link mediator influence to
"fundamental social values and preferred moral order. '' 417 As Kolb found in
relation to corporate-labor mediation: "[M]ediators are not passive actors
within the system, and the more they share its ideology, the more likely it is
that they will, sometimes unwittingly, mobilize or accentuate the biases that
already exist in the system.' 418
C. Who is Benefiting From the Current Discourse on Mediation?
Thus, we are left to ponder the question, who is benefiting from the
current discourse? Perhaps the court benefits in alleviating some case
volume, or enhancing court revenues 41 9 by obtaining free or low-cost
services, or by offering what seem to be alternatives to formal processes.
The individual parties using mediation primarily express satisfaction, 420 and
may likely be saving money in court costs and attorneys fees. The public is
satisfied by the quick fix, exemplified in high settlement rates.421 Mediators
continue to willingly offer their services despite paltry levels of
remuneration. So everybody is happy. It is a win-win solution.
Yet the "red flag" goes up when there is subtle (or not so subtle),422
coercion to be cooperative and conciliatory,423 thus calling into question
417. See Della Noce, Bush & Folger, supra note, 45 at 57.
418. KOLB, supra note 37, at 164.
419. SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA, STATE OF THE JUDICIARY REPORT (2005),
http://www.courts.state.va.us/reports/2005/state of thejudiciary-report.pdf. Chief Justice Hassell
stated that Virginia's Judiciary System collects over 1.2 billion dollars annually for the
Commonwealth. Id.
420. See Office of the Executive Secretary, Statistical Mediation Information, supra note 296,
which shows that 93% of parties found mediation helpful, 90.7% would use mediation again, 94.1%
would recommend it to others and 83.7% reached agreement.
421. See Della Noce, supra note 18, at 550-51.
422. See Fineman, supra note 16, at 767-68, asserting that "by branding opposition to
mediation and joint custody as the manifestation of a psychological problem to which mediation is
itself the solution, mediation rhetoric forecloses any effective expression of women's legitimate
concerns."
423. While mediation is still voluntary in most states, there are hidden coercions to mediate.
For example, in determining custody, the deciding judge must refer to the factor #7 in the Virginia
statute. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.3 (2008). That factor requires the court consider: "The relative
willingness and demonstrated ability of each parent to maintain a close and continuing relationship
with the child, and the ability of each parent to cooperate in and resolve disputes regarding matters
affecting the child." See also Fineman, supra note 16, at 766, noting how:
One of the most harmful assumptions underlying social workers' discourse is that a
parent who seeks sole custody of a child has some illegitimate motivation ... the
general assumption is that the parent who is willing to live up to the ideal of shared
custody and control is the one with the child's real interests at heart.
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mediator practices.4 Critics maintain that the attention on informal or
alternative processes, is a distraction from holding the court accountable to
be accessible and to dispense justice.425 Using words such as neutrality,
impartiality, self-determination, fairness, and good faith in a context that
substitutes cooperation for legal rights,426 makes these ideals not only
meaningless, but potentially poisonous. 427 The promise of mediation to be:
"an informal process in which a neutral third party with no power to impose
a resolution helps the disputing parties try to reach a mutually acceptable
,421 wesettlement," is suspect when critiqued by an analysis that looks at
communication as "symbolic, relational and highly political. 429
D. Reality Testing About Mediation: It Is Necessary to Name Models in
Order to Fulfill the Mandate of Self-Determination of the Parties
The critics point out the contradictions between the promise of
mediation and the actuality. Let's do some reality testing about mediation.
Naming specific models based on differing theories of what causes and
resolves conflict and identifying the norms each model references, would
make the process choices visible,430 understandable, and clear to mediators
and parties. Training and mentoring that clarifies, compares, and
differentiates among mediation models431  and explains other dispute
424. See Della Noce, supra note 18, at 552.
425. See HARRINGTON, supra note 12, at 78, quoting the Director of Legal Services
Corporation Thomas Ehrlich: "[T]here is a danger, which we have seen, that the new forums will
become institutionalized screening mechanisms for moving cases out of the court system instead of
attempts to deliver justice with better results and greater access by the public."
426. See CONLEY & O'BARR, supra note 3, at 46, stating that "in her book The Illusion of
Equality: The Rhetoric and Reality of Divorce Reform (Fineman 1991), Fineman characterizes the
recent history of divorce law as a successful struggle by the 'helping professions' (social workers
and various kinds of therapists) to substitute their discourse for that of the law."
427. See VICTOR KLEMPERER, THE LANGUAGE OF THE THIRD REICH 14 (Martin Brady trans.,
Continuum 2006) (1957), stating that "[w]ords can be like tiny doses of arsenic: they are swallowed
unnoticed, appear to have no effect, and then after a little time the toxic reaction sets in after all."
428. See BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 22, at 2.
429. Cobb, supra note 79, at 89.
430. See Moffitt, supra note 161, at 8, noting:
The gap between what a mediator explains to the parties and what she tries to do with, to
or for the parties is often wide. This reluctance towards transparency is reflected both in
the existing prescriptive mediation literature and in the current lack of descriptive
research focusing on this question.
431. See Oberman, supra note 148, at 821 n.198.
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resolution processes 432 would prevent further misconceptions about and
misrepresentations of the available processes. Such training and mentoring
would give mediators a way to fulfill the requirement of insuring self-
determination of the parties. 433 Rather than promoting a "one size fits all
43 4
or "one-stop-shopping ' 435 process, mediators would thus support parties in
determining whether they would be better served as individuals or groups,
by a specific mediation model, another dispute resolution process, or by
exercising their right to be heard in court.
432. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-576.4 (2008) ("Scope and Definitions"). In defining "Dispute
Resolution proceeding" the statute names "mediation, conciliation, early neutral evaluation,
nonjudicial settlement conferences" and also allows for "any other proceeding leading to a voluntary
settlement conducted with the requirements of this chapter." Id. Yet very few mediators are familiar
with other processes besides litigation and it would very likely be rare to find a mediator who would
discuss all these options with parties in the orientation, or to find this emphasized in mediation
trainings.
433. See Oberman, supra note 148, at 818.
434. See Dubuc, supra note 360.
435. See Stemple, supra note 2, at 384.
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